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ABSTRACT
Fowler, Brian. Action and Outcome: The Connection Between Organizational Goals and
Organizational Effectiveness in Major League Baseball. Published Doctor of Philosophy
dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2021.

Major League Baseball (MLB) provides an optimal setting to investigate the effects of
specific strategic organizational goals and decisions on various key performance indicators
(KPIs). The choice to primarily pursue wins or profits (i.e., win maximization or profit
maximization), along with how efficiently organizations spend their budgets (i.e., utility), have
been shown to impact competitive balance, social welfare, and ticket pricing of sports leagues.
The present research builds on the work of previous scholars by empirically examining MLB
organizational management at the individual team level.
Data collected for the current research included financial information and organizational
KPIs for all 30 MLB teams from a ten-year period (2010-2019), which resulted in sample
population of 300 team-year observations to be analyzed. Through the utilization of a two-way
MANCOVA analysis, the current study was able to group teams by organizational goal and
spending efficiency to determine differences between groups in terms of the identified KPIs.
Results indicated that win-maximization teams were likely to experience relatively higher levels
in most of the KPIs (e.g., wins, revenue, & franchise value), while the profit-maximizers were
more likely to improve their bottom line through conservative and efficient spending. These
findings were consistent with the theoretical frameworks associated with win, profit, and utility

iii

maximization. Furthermore, the current findings offer new context to the body of research, as
well as a preliminary framework for deciphering the individual goals and decisions of sport
organizations based on their financial statements.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the famous philosophical novel Atlas Shrugged (Rand, 1957), character Hank Rearden
stated: “To me, there’s only one form of human depravity—the man without a purpose” (p. 142).
In the context of the book and its fictional, dystopian version of the United States, this quote
refers to the morality of humanity and how a lack of purpose can be detrimental. However, the
quote also has applications in reality, specifically in the realm of business. Just like Rand (1957)
alluded to the failure of humanity due to lack of direction, a real-world business will also fail
without a core purpose.
When identifying the core purpose of an organization, Sinek (2009) suggested that the
key is to understand why your company exists. The reason for existence then provides the
foundation upon which the organization is built and operates. A key determinant of how the
business then operates can be profit orientation (Chelladurai, 2014). Profit orientation, or the
categorization of whether the purpose of an organization is to make a profit, can be classified
into one of three sectors: (a) for-profit, (b) non-profit, or (c) not-for-profit (Chelladurai, 2014;
OpenStax, 2018). For-profit businesses often operate in the private sector and have the core
purpose of furthering the financial gain of the company (Strine, 2012). In other words, the
majority of decisions made by a for-profit organization are influenced by the goal of making
money for sole benefit of the company. Examples of for-profit organizations are numerous, with
some of the most prominent being those companies included in the Fortune 500. Strine (2012)
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also noted that for-profit organizations do not receive government aid and are required to pay
applicable taxes due to the nature of their business operations for their own personal gain.
Non-profit organizations bear a stark contrast to their for-profit counterparts. According
to Chelladurai (2014), the core purpose of a non-profit is typically to further the interests of a
charity or social cause. Decisions by non-profits are therefore driven by the charitable mission
and are not made solely based upon turning a profit. However, this is not to say that these
organizations cannot generate income. The income and donations generated must just be used in
a manner that is considered beneficial to the cause of the non-profit (OpenStax, 2018). Due to all
income being used for a charitable purpose, non-profits are tax-exempt and sometimes receive
other governmental aid to help further their cause. Some of the most recognizable non-profit
organizations include the American Red Cross, Habitat for Humanity, and the United Way.
On the spectrum of for-profit and non-profit, not-for-profit organizations fall somewhere
in between. Grimalda and Sacconi (2005) explained that on the surface, not-for-profits typically
operate like a for-profit business. Yet, the core purpose is not to generate a profit but to benefit a
group of people through the reinvestment of profits back into the organization (Grimalda &
Sacconi, 2005). A prime example of a not-for-profit business is a hospital. Not-for-profit
hospitals operate similarly to their for-profit counterparts by offering the same services to their
patients. The difference comes in the missions of each: Not-for profit hospitals are meant to
serve and benefit the community where they reside. Therefore, they offer benefits to their
patients by providing aid such as more uncompensated care (Duggan, 2002).
The three classifications of profit orientation (for-profit, non-profit, & not-for-profit)
discussed above encompass the vast majority of industries in terms of guiding the ways in which
organizational goals and core purposes are carried out (Chelladurai, 2014). However, one
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industry where this does not apply is in professional sport. Professional sport teams, specifically
in the United States, are considered for-profit organizations, as they pay taxes and make
decisions based on the interests of their own organization (Andreff & Staudohar, 2002). At
surface level, this mirrors the operations of any other for-profit business. The difference comes
when the core purposes and mission statements of the organizations are analyzed. Professional
sport teams are concerned with profits but can also be driven by wins (Fort, 2015). This assertion
by Fort (2015) is supported by MLB team mission statements, as a large portion of these mention
winning as a top priority (e.g., Kansas City Royals; New York Yankees; Seattle Mariners).
While the relationship between profits and wins is not mutually exclusive, it is also not entirely
mutually inclusive either. According to Fort and Quirk (2004), how a team owner decides to
balance the objectives of profits and/or wins becomes an organizational goal and is quite
possibly the largest factor in shaping the direction and make-up of the organization.
The conundrum concerning winning and profits is a product of the nature of professional
sport. Fort (2015) and Zimbalist (2003) both alluded to this point when explaining that higher
profits are achieved through increased revenue and decreased expenses, while improving a
team’s chances of winning is done by, among other things, increasing the amount of talent on
that team. Furthermore, the acquisition of talent is an expense, and high-level talent is often more
costly than the alternative (Fort, 2015; Zimbalist, 2003). In other words, for teams to position
themselves to have a better chance of winning games they often need to spend large amounts of
money. The large amount of money spent on winning can then cut into the amount of profit the
organization makes. Ultimately, the paradox between profits and wins pushes team owners and
management to make a decision. The decision of an affinity toward winning or profits then
becomes a core organizational goal that drives decision-making for that team (Fort, 2015).
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Evidence of a tradeoff between pursuit of profits and wins can be found in many different
professional sports including all of the “Big Four” professional sports of North America: Major
League Baseball (MLB; e.g., Alexander, 2001), National Basketball Association (NBA; e.g.,
Berri, 2006), National Football League (NFL; e.g., Clopton, 2013), and National Hockey League
(NHL; e.g., Rockerbie, 2015). However, of the “Big Four” North American Sports, MLB stands
as the best league to highlight the choice between profits and wins for a couple reasons. First,
MLB does not have a salary floor, where the NBA, NFL, and NHL do (Dietl et al., 2010).
According to Dietl et al. (2010), a salary floor is an agreed upon minimum amount that a team
must spend on their total player salary. For example, in the NBA each team must spend at least
90% of the salary cap for a given year on player salaries (NBA.com, 2019). So, with the absence
of a salary floor in MLB, there are no restrictions on the minimum a team can spend on player
salaries which may allow teams who want to increase profit by minimizing expenses to spend
less in the area of total team salary.
Another MLB rule that assists in magnifying the choice between profits and wins is the
lack of a salary cap for the league. A salary cap acts as the upper bound of which a team can pay
in total for all the players on their roster (Dietl et al., 2010). While the NBA, NFL, and NHL all
have some form of a salary cap, MLB does not. What MLB does have is a league-implemented
luxury tax, also known as the competitive balance tax, which taxes any payroll of a team that
goes above a set threshold. Yet this does not seem to deter wealthier, larger market teams, who
regularly seem to have an advantage over their smaller-market counterparts (Lee & Fort, 2005).
In fact, Hasan (2008) found that MLB teams with higher payrolls and who regularly exceed the
competitive balance tax (e.g., New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, & Los Angeles Dodgers)
also generally have a significantly higher winning percentage than those teams who regularly
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have lower payrolls. So, the lack of a strong constraint on the upper end of team payrolls in MLB
allows teams who want to pursue wins to spend significantly more than other teams who may be
pursuing different strategies.
The combination of no salary floor and the lack of salary cap in MLB creates the largest
gap in team payrolls in the “Big Four” sports. To illustrate the large gap in MLB payrolls
compared to its counterparts, Table 1.1 lists the teams with the highest and lowest payrolls, along
with the respective gap in pay, for the seasons that began in 2019.
Table 1.1
2019 League Payrolls Differences
League

High Team

Payroll

Low Team

Payroll

Gap

MLB

Boston

$229.20

Tampa Bay

$64.18

$165.02

NBA

Portland

$137.67

Atlanta

$112.34

$25.33

NFL

San Francisco

$221.69

Kansas City

$167.01

$54.68

NHL

New York Isl.

$85.97

New Jersey

$62.96

$23.01

Note. Payroll and Gap are in millions of dollars.
Table 1.1 shows that the gap in MLB is about three times larger than the NFL, which was
the league with the second largest gap. The vast spectrum of team payrolls compared to other
leagues demonstrates the freedom MLB owners and management have in constructing and
compensating their teams. In turn, MLB organizations also have more autonomy to set
organizational goals such as winning games or making profits, and then actively pursuing those
goals.
To measure the achievement of organizational goals, an organization can apply the
concept of organizational effectiveness. According to Cameron (2015), organizational
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effectiveness has a somewhat broad definition and is generally thought of as a construct that
refers to how well a company operates. As with most abstract or broad concepts, a way to
operationally define and measure them is needed. In order to measure organizational
effectiveness, key performance indicators (KPI) are often developed and used (Eckerson, 2006).
Bauer (2004) defined KPIs as the following:
KPIs are quantifiable metrics which reflect the performance of an organization in
achieving its goals and objectives. KPIs reflect strategic value drivers rather than just
measuring non-critical business activities and processes. KPIs align all levels of an
organization (business units, departments and individuals) with clearly defined and
cascaded targets and benchmarks to create accountability and track progress. (p. 63)
Examples of KPIs for a professional sport franchise that is pursuing profits or wins could include
the obvious measures of profits (Késenne, 2006) and wins (Clopton, 2013). However, less
obvious metrics such as attendance (Davis, 2008), cost of attendance (Coates & Humphreys,
2007), team construction (Hill et al., 2017), wage dispersion (Annala & Winfree, 2011; Hill et
al., 2017), and franchise value (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Scelles et al., 2016) are also pertinent.
By utilizing KPIs that indicate organizational effectiveness, MLB organizations can then begin
to determine the impact of their organizational goals.
Statement of Purpose
The situation described above begs the question: For an MLB team, what is the
difference between operating with a strategic organizational goal of profits versus a strategic
organizational goal of winning? Therefore, the purpose of this research was to analyze
differences in varying strategic organizational goals (i.e., profits or wins) through the use of KPIs
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representing organizational effectiveness. End results of this study provide empirical evidence
demonstrating expected outcomes based on the pursuit of profits or wins in MLB.
The idea for the current study is based upon several theories, the first of which are profit
maximization (PM) and win maximization (WM). A PM strategy, as it pertains to sport, refers to
a situation where ownership would “invest in team success up to the point where the expected
marginal revenue from an additional win is equal to the marginal cost” (Zimbalist, 2003, p. 506).
A WM strategy, however, allows for additional spending toward team success. Teams that have
the goal of WM spend all revenues, or at least spend to a preset floor, with the ultimate goal of
winning as many games as possible (Késenne, 2006). In application to the current research, the
theories of PM and WM indicate that a team with a primary organizational goal of wins would
spend a larger percentage of their revenues than a team with the primary organizational goal of
profits.
Utility maximization (UM) is another theory that was used to guide the current study. As
opposed to PM and WM which influence the amount of money spent, UM is only concerned
with efficiency. In UM, the perspective is from the consumer and utility is maximized when the
consumer gets the most value for the amount of money spent (Hall & Lieberman, 2008). When
we look at MLB teams as consumers, they are buying talent to win games. The teams that spend
the least amount of money per win are those that are coming closer to maximizing their utility
(Rascher, 1997). For the current study, the application of UM as an efficiency measure helped
provide a more complete picture of how teams are executing their strategic organizational goals
of profits or wins.
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Rationale
Previous sport scholars have covered PM, WM, and UM in many different capacities.
The bulk of research has been focused in the setting of European soccer (e.g., Garcia-del-Barrio
& Szymanski, 2009; Késenne, 2006) due to the widely held notion that professional clubs in
Europe tend to be win maximizers. Similarly, in research on North American sport, researchers
have focused on PM and UM due to the generally accepted belief that sports teams in the United
States tend to be more concerned with profits (Berri, 2006; Clopton, 2013). However, the
commonality among almost all previous research on PM, WM, and UM is that it all has been
based at the league level. In other words, previous scholars in this research line have treated
leagues as entities that fall into a category of WM, PM, UM, or a mix. Then the impact of those
strategies has been studied in terms of competitive balance, social welfare, and ticket pricing on
a league-wide basis (Dietl et al., 2009; Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009; Marburger, 1997).
However, contrary to grouping every team in a league together under one strategy, Zimbalist
(2003) suggested that strategies of individual team owners within a league could vary
substantially when it came to profits or wins. This is where a gap in the research exists: To date,
there has been virtually no research on the impact of PM, WM, or UM strategies on the
individual team level. Therefore, the central objective of the current study was to explore PM,
WM, and UM as primary organizational goals, and compare the differences of these strategies at
the individual team level.
Research Questions and Objectives
To analyze PM, WM, and UM on an MLB team level, quantitative financial data were
collected and used to determine overall team strategies. Differences in these categorical
strategies were then analyzed based on the organizational effectiveness KPIs discussed above.
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The statistical method used for the analysis was a multivariate analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA), which uncovered differences in the organizational goals while allowing
covariates to be controlled. The questions that guided the current research are as follows:
Q1

Is there a difference between a primary MLB organizational goal of wins versus a
primary organizational goal of profits in terms of KPIs representing
organizational effectiveness?

Q2

Is there a difference in levels of utility achieved through spending efficiency by
MLB teams as measured by the KPIs signifying organizational effectiveness?

Q3

Is there an interaction effect between primary MLB organizational goals and
spending efficiency in terms of their relationship with the organizational
effectiveness KPIs?
Structural Overview

The remainder of this dissertation is broken into four chapters. Chapter II, which is the
literature review, expands upon the relevant theories and theoretical framework to provide better
context, rationale, and explanation for the current study. Topics covered are the theories of PM,
WM, and UM, along with organizational effectiveness and its representative key performance
indicators for sport. Following that, Chapter III covers methodology for the current study
including research design, in-depth variable description, data collection, and statistical analysis.
Chapter IV reports the results of the statistical analysis. Finally, Chapter V consists of three
parts. First, a discussion of the results based on the theories and framework described in the
literature review is presented. Next, implications of the findings are suggested, and practical
applications are considered. Finally, the fifth chapter of the study concludes with comments on
generalizability, limitations, and future research directions.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The review of literature for this study is divided into five sections covering relevant
theories, theoretical framework, and their applications to the current research. The first provides
a detailed description of PM including its origins in business and its sport applications. The
second segment explains WM and its contrast to PM in the sport setting. The third section details
UM in both business and sport by covering various examples and interpretations of previous
scholars. The fourth section transitions to the dependent variables of the current research by
giving a thorough review of organizational effectiveness and KPIs. Included in the review of
organizational effectiveness are subsections addressing each individual KPI that pertains to MLB
teams and the current research. Finally, the review of literature culminates with hypotheses for
the current study’s research questions (see Chapter I) based upon the information presented in
the four subsequent sections.
Profit Maximization
Profit maximization is a long-standing model which many organizations have used to
make strategic decisions (Howard & Crompton, 2014; Knight, 1921). When considering PM, it
is assumed that in most normal business cases, a rational company with a profit orientation of
for-profit will always seek to maximize their profits (Hall, 2019). According to Brunkhorst and
Fenn (2010), PM occurs when the revenues exceed costs and the gap between those two is
maximized. Furthermore, PM is often explained using marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost
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(MC), where MR is the additional revenue, and MC is the additional cost, incurred by producing
one more unit (Hall, 2019). Profit is then maximized when MR is equal to MC. That formula is
displayed below:
𝑀𝐶 = 𝑀𝑅

(1)

Below, a graphical representation for further clarification is given in Figure 2.1. The x-axis
represents output quantity (Q), while the y-axis stands for costs and revenue respectively (C and
R). As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the optimum quantity for output is O*, where MR and MC
intersect. After this point, it does not make sense to produce additional units because the cost for
production will exceed the revenue gained. Similarly, prior to this point, the revenue for making
one more unit still exceeds the cost of that unit. So, in that case the decision should be made to
continue producing.
Figure 2.1
Profit Maximization

In the 1960s, Continental Airlines utilized the idea that MR should equal MC to gain a
competitive advantage. According to Hall and Lieberman (2008), airlines at the time were using
total cost instead of MC to determine the cost of a flight. With this calculation, a flight needed to
be 65% full to break even. If a particular flight route was not consistently at least 65% full, it
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would be cancelled. However, Continental Airlines discovered that this was actually an
inaccurate assumption because the calculation of total cost also included many sunk costs that
would be incurred whether a flight took off or not. By substituting MC for total cost, the sunk
costs were not included in the break-even equation, and Continental Airlines then figured that the
break-even point actually occurred when flights were only 50% full. The new calculation
allowed the company to offer, and even add, more flights. Many people were skeptical of this
decision, but because of the decision, Continental Airlines profits rose considerably (Hall &
Lieberman, 2008).
There are many other examples of utilizing PM in practice. Probably the most traditional
use is for manufacturers to determine price for their products, which was confirmed by Jobber
and Hooley (1987) who reported that many firms (roughly 50%) had a primary concern of PM.
Another scholar reported that PM can drive the decision of selecting the proper hours of
operation for a retailer (Ferris, 1990). As long as revenue generated from staying open an
additional hour exceeds the cost of that additional hour, then the store should stay open. Finally,
the idea of PM can also be applied to advertising. The premise is that an organization should
continue paying for additional advertising as long as the added revenue from running the
advertisement one additional time outweighs the added cost associated (i.e., comparing MR and
MC; Dorfman & Steiner, 1954).
Profit Maximization in Sport
Profit maximization is a prevalent topic in sport management literature. Scholars have
often used PM as a categorization for teams or leagues and then explored how those
organizations make decisions based on that categorization. Zimbalist (2003) suggested that
“analyzing leagues (and teams) under the profit-maximization assumption provides a useful
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efficiency standard against which to assess actual performance” (p. 504). Operationalizing this
notion, El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) took a general look at the major professional sports leagues
in the United States and built a model based on their various rules and economics. Geographical
location and the associated revenue generation potential was found to be a key determinant of
whether a team exhibited profit-maximizing tendencies. Furthermore, achieving the goal of
equalization in playing strength (i.e., competitive balance) was found to not occur in a league
driven by PM (El-Hodiri & Quirk, 1971).
The association between ticket pricing and PM has also received attention from sport
scholars. Most often the question to be answered is whether or not tickets are priced to maximize
profits. The general answer is that in most cases, including baseball (Marburger, 1997; Rascher
et al., 2007; Shapiro & Drayer, 2014), football (Brunkhorst & Fenn, 2010), and hockey
(Ferguson et al., 1991), tickets are priced with PM in mind. Taking this one step further,
Krautmann and Berri (2007), as well as Marburger (1997), both identified that ticket prices
usually fall within the inelastic section of demand, which on the surface would not reflect PM.
However, when combined with revenue from concessions and other complementary goods, the
organizations were still exhibiting tendencies that were reflective of profit-maximizing behavior
(Krautmann & Berri, 2007; Marburger, 1997). In other words, tickets were intentionally priced
lower in order to attract more potential customers for concessions.
In many of the above examples, it is assumed that all teams in a league take a similar
approach. However, this may not be the case. Dietl et al. (2009) theoretically compared the
social welfare of three different types of leagues: One comprised of all profit-maximizers, one
with teams who were primarily focused on winning (win-maximizers), and one that was a mix
between the two. Social welfare was found to increase with PM, meaning that the league, as a
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whole, was healthier in all aspects when teams were most concerned with turning a profit.
Similarly, revenue sharing was found to be much more beneficial to social welfare when the
orientation of teams was aligned (Dietl et al., 2009). This makes sense because in a mixed
league, profit-maximizers would not be happy to share revenue with those trying to maximize
wins and vice versa.
Win Maximization
Win maximization is an organizational goal that is strictly limited to sports. It is
concerned with maximizing the number of games that the team wins while being unconcerned
with the profits of the organization. In providing a fitting definition of WM, Clopton (2013)
stated:
the objectives of win-maximizing owners are most concerned with maximizing wins
rather than profits…This model of owner objective assumes that the most effective way
to maximize the team’s winning percentage is to maximize the playing talent of the
team…Owners of this type are assumed to spend as much money as will allow under the
current policies and restrictions of their league. (p. 210)
Furthermore, win-maximizing teams may occasionally even have financial losses, which an
owner would see as acceptable as long as their team was winning at a high enough level. Owners
of these win-maximizing teams typically also value talent higher than their profit-maximizing
counterparts, which means they will often pay more to acquire those players (Clopton, 2013).
With WM being a fairly new concept compared to its counterpart (i.e., PM), there are a
few competing models to represent WM. The first is concerned with maximizing winning
percentage by spending all profits on team improvements. That model is represented by the
following equation proposed by Késenne (2006):
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max w
sub R – C = 0,

(2)

where w is the winning percentage of a team, C is the total cost in a season, and R is total season
revenue. This equation model can also be slightly modified to reflect where profits are only spent
to a certain set point:
max w
sub R – C = 𝜋 0 ,

(3)

where 𝜋 0 is a preset floor for profits, and all of the excess can be spent to improve the team
(Késenne, 2006). However, criticism exists for WM models where the variable being maximized
is wins. Fort and Quirk (2004) argued that wins, or winning percentage, are not an operational
objective because winning and losing games cannot be completely controlled. Instead, the best
effort a team can give to maximize wins is to maximize the amount of talent that plays for their
team. In response to the proposal, Késenne (2006) offered a third model of maximizing talent:
max 𝑥𝑖
sub 𝑅𝑖 [𝑚𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 ] − 𝑐𝑥𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 ,

(4)

where xi is the amount of talent on team I, 𝜋𝑖 is a fixed amount of profits, R is the team’s season
revenue with m (market size) and w (winning percentage) acting as factors for the revenue, and c
is the marginal cost for talent.
All three models shown above have their own strengths and weaknesses with each
lending itself to certain situations depending on context, data availability, and the research
question(s) being asked. However, the main idea of each model is the same: to maximize
winning percentage (or talent level) of a team under the breakeven constraint of zero profits (or
the preset minimum profit level).
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The majority of previous scholars have applied WM in the context of professional
European soccer. A suggested reason for the geographical concentration of WM research was the
generally accepted belief that professional sports teams in the United States act as profit
maximizers, while professional clubs in Europe tend to be more focused on winning (i.e., win
maximizers; Késenne, 2006; Késenne & Pauwels, 2006). Confirming this notion, Garcia-delBarrio and Szymanski (2009) analyzed WM vs. PM in multiple top soccer leagues across
Europe. Findings showed that there was an overwhelming affinity for WM that was subject to a
zero-profit budget constraint. Possible explanations for the WM behavior were the strong
connections (fandom) that Europeans have toward their preferred team and the relegation
system, which encourages teams to win so they do not fall out of the international spotlight
(Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009).
Further analysis of European soccer has uncovered some perceived negative effects of
the proclivity toward WM. Késenne (2010) investigated whether WM caused a team to overpay
for talent. In an investigation of the top Belgian soccer league, players were found to, on average,
be paid significantly above their marginal productivity. In other words, in situations with win
maximizers, the team risks paying players more than they are actually worth due to the
competition from other teams to acquire talent. Regarding the pressure to win and the reckless
overpayment of players, multiple scholars have indicated that clubs across Europe are in
financial trouble, which is quite alarming because some clubs receive government funding
(Késenne, 2006, 2010).
Overall, WM is built on good intentions. Team ownership is focused on putting their
team in the best position to win, which theoretically creates an ideal situation for the fans
(Clopton, 2013). However, in the relentless pursuit of wins, there are some inherent financial
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issues that can surface when profit is ignored (Késenne, 2006, 2010). Terrien et al., (2017)
identified this two-sided issue and offered a possible solution: The club could switch orientation
from year to year based on identified financial needs and their projected position within the
league.
Application of Profit Maximization
and Win Maximization to
the Current Study
In a perfect, theoretical environment the idea of looking at sport organizations as strictly
profit-maximizers, or strictly win-maximizers, is convenient for making inferences on the impact
of those strategies. However the situation is not quite that clear. Very few, if any, teams 100%
subscribe to either a PM or WM strategy (Dietl et al., 2011; Zimbalist, 2003). Without being a
member of management or getting information directly from ownership, determining the exact
organizational strategy regarding PM or WM for an empirical study is difficult. What can be
ascertained by looking at team financial statements is a general preference between profits and
wins compared to other organizations in a league (Dietl et al., 2009; Zimbalist, 2003).
To compare the financial statements of MLB teams, general financial equations and
ratios (e.g., profits & profit margin) must be kept in mind. Teams within the same league have
fairly similar expenses on a year-to-year basis as the costs to operate within a given league are
similar. However, team payroll, especially in the MLB, is not fixed. In fact, team payroll is one
of the largest and most varied expenses between teams in professional leagues like MLB (Annala
& Winfree, 2011; Mondello & Maxcy, 2009). The variation in payroll can be attributed to
multiple factors including strategic organizational goals, market size, and team budget (Késenne,
2010; Krautmann, 2009).
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Revenues amongst teams within MLB also vary greatly, with teams in larger markets
typically making more revenue (Krautmann, 2009). This team-to-team variation in resources also
influences budget size for talent acquisition. Due to the large range in player salary budgets, it
cannot be said with certainty that teams who spend more on payroll are pursuing wins while
teams who spend less are pursuing profits. It might just mean that the team who is spending more
simply has a larger budget. A better approximation to decide if a team prefers profits or wins is
to examine profit margin (Clopton, 2013; Késenne, 2006). By using profit margin, it can be seen
how many cents of profit are generated from each dollar of revenue. Also, differences in profit
margin can be compared to make conjectures about spending habits. This approach is supported
by equation 2 listed above, which theoretically shows that a true WM team would spend all
revenues to the point of zero profits leaving very little if any profit margin (Késenne, 2006).
Utilizing the above concept, the current study divided teams into groups based on the
profit margin. Teams with lower profit margins were viewed as spending a larger percentage of
their available budget, and therefore grouped and considered to have the strategic organizational
goal of wins. Those teams with higher profit margins were grouped and considered to prefer a
strategic goal of profits.
Utility Maximization
On a spectrum, PM and WM are basically opposite viewpoints from the perspective of
the producer or price-setter. Utility maximization on the other hand, while similar to both, has
the perspective changed to that of the consumer. So, UM is basically the process of a consumer
attempting to get the greatest value possible for the least amount spent (Hall & Lieberman,
2008). According to Strotz (1955), whether people are conscious of it or not, they regularly
employ UM in their everyday lives. This can be a purchase decision of a cheaper off-brand
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product that is perceived to be of similar quality to the more expensive brand name product
(Chintagunta, 1993). While another example could be a decision to take a new job based on the
superior income, independence, and risk-level that is associated with the position (Douglas &
Shepherd, 2002). In both examples, the decision involved choosing the alternative with the most
utility at the least expense, and therefore applied UM theory.
The general equation for UM is similar to the MR is equal to MC associated with profit
maximization. Welker (2019) gave the following equation for UM:
Mux/Px = Muy/Py,

(5)

where Mux is the marginal utility from good x, P is the price, and Muy is the marginal utility
from good y. In explaining the above equation, Welker (2019) stated that “A consumer should
spend his limited money income on the goods which give him the most marginal utility per
dollar. Only when the ratio of MU/P is equal for all goods is a consumer maximizing his total
utility” (para. 1). This means that utility is maximized when the alternative is selected that
provides the largest possible amount of utility at a set price. Below in Figure 2.2 is an example of
UM using the choice between two alternatives: ice cream (x-axis) and candy (y-axis). Each of
the three indifference curves represents a certain level of utility, and the dotted line represents the
budget. In UM, the point where you can get the most utility for the set budget is the point where
utility is maximized, which in this case is illustrated by point A in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2
Utility Maximization

Utility Maximization in Sport
As stated above, UM is viewed from the perspective of the consumer. In sport
management research, this often means that the role of consumer is occupied by the professional
sports teams, and players or other assets teams are looking to acquire are viewed as the product.
To model UM in that respect, Rascher (1997) offered the following function:
Max 𝑈𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖 )𝜋𝑖 ,

(6)

where 𝛼𝑖 is the proportion that owner I trades off winning and profit in their utility function,
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the wins for team I, and 𝜋𝑖 is the profits from winning. One interesting aspect of the
Rascher (1997) equation is the flexibility given by the ability to adjust the tradeoff between
winning and profit. This allows it to be adjusted to handle any and all levels of a team’s
preference for winning vs. profits, as long as those levels are somehow able to be discerned.
Putting the utility function into practice, Madden and Robinson (2012) analyzed soccer in
the United Kingdom from 2001 to 2010. By gathering profits from ticket sales and expenditures
on players, they were able to implement the UM function to determine that support had been
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growing for the league and teams throughout that time period. Consequently, there was also a
noticeable rise in ticket prices and team expenditures, which fueled both sides of the UM
(Madden & Robinson, 2012). These findings lend a better understanding to the true give-andtake relationship of profits and winning that is often present in professional sports.
As mentioned before, the impression exists that professional sports franchises in the
United States are almost strictly profit-maximizers (Késenne, 2006; Késenne & Pauwels, 2006).
However, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Many scholars point to the presence of
UM in professional sports of the United States. Dietl et al. (2011) found that “evidence from the
real world of major league sports, however, suggests that clubs trade-off profits and wins” (p.
296). This finding suggested that Major League Baseball (MLB) teams are mostly utility
maximizers because they give attention to both winning and profits. Further findings from Dietl
et al. (2011) suggested that when revenue sharing increased marginal revenue, more investment
is encouraged, which can help improve the overall competitive balance of the league.
Similarly, Vrooman (1997) utilized a version of the UM equation to model the growing
labor market in MLB. The constantly growing salaries of free agency were shown to be a
function of UM where teams were investing to win more games. Winning games then caused
increased profits from attendance among other things, and finally teams then reinvested their
profits into higher-priced talent (Vrooman, 1997). The explanation of this cycle in baseball
serves as a prime example of the assertion from Strotz (1955) that UM is at work in everyday
decisions whether we are conscious of the phenomenon or not.
Application of Utility Maximization
to the Current Study
Two key pieces from the above review of UM provided framework for the current study.
First, the base concept of UM is that the consumer, which in this case is an MLB team, is trying

22
to get the most value for the money they spend (Hall & Lieberman, 2008; Strotz, 1955). Second,
the concept of UM is not mutually exclusive from PM or WM as a strategic organizational goal
(Dietl et al., 2011; Madden & Robinson, 2012; Vrooman, 1997). Win-maximizing teams
approach UM as they win more games, and therefore, decrease the team salary cost per win for
the season. The same concept also applies for profit-maximizing teams. Though they may win
less games, they have also theoretically spent less on team salary. Therefore, the utility received
from their team payroll (PM teams) can be judged on a per game basis just like WM teams.
Utilizing the two concepts mentioned above, the current study divided MLB teams into
groups based on the utility they received from their money spent. Utility was calculated as the
ratio of team payroll in a given year to the number of wins in that season. The amount spent per
win then dictated whether that team was placed in the high utility or low utility group. This
grouping of high or low utility, along with the strategic goal grouping of profits or wins, acted as
the two independent variables of the two-way MANCOVA analysis for the current study.
Organizational Effectiveness
Organizational effectiveness can be defined as how effectively an organization meets its
desired outcomes (Cameron, 2015). Similarly, Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957) stated that
“organizational effectiveness (sometimes called organizational “success” or organizational
“worth”) is ordinarily used to refer to goal-attainment. In this sense, it is a functional rather than
a structural concept. Furthermore, it is probably most useful in comparative organizational
research” (p. 534). The combination of these two definitions represents organizational
effectiveness as a measurement tool for organizational goals. The problematic portion of
organizational effectiveness, however, is that no standardized measurement for organizational
effectiveness exists (Cameron, 2015).
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The majority of scholarly research in the area of organizational effectiveness falls into
one of two categories: studies attempting to further define organizational effectiveness; or studies
utilizing organizational effectiveness as measurement. Scholars in the first category, who are
attempting to further define organizational effectiveness, usually take an approach of adapting
and testing models for measurement (e.g., Cameron, 1986, 2015; Steers, 1975). This line of
research has yielded some useful models to fit many situations: (a) ideal type model, (b) goal
model, (c) natural systems model, (d) internal processes model, I strategic constituencies model,
and (f) abundance model.
The ideal type model is the idea of finding an organization to mirror or imitate. In this
sense, effectiveness would mean matching desired characteristics of an organization that is
deemed ideal and following the path that this ideal organization has already established
(Cameron, 2015). The ideal type model would be beneficial to start-up organizations and/or
organizations that are actively looking to expand and grow.
Goal model is likely the most readily associated with organizational effectiveness. It is
the idea mentioned above that organizational effectiveness is entirely based on achievement of
desired goals (Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum, 1957). Again, the difficulty here is defining a goal
so it is measurable. This is why organizational effectiveness is often linked to SMART goals
(Cameron, 2015). SMART is an acronym that stands of specific, measurable, attainable, relevant,
and time-based. All the facets of a SMART goal then help the organization assess how
effectively the goal was met.
The next two models, natural systems and internal processes, are very closely related.
Both models are associated with the flow of information and the completion of organizational
tasks. The internal processes model analyzes how items within the business operate, while
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natural systems assesses how items and information flow in and out of the organization (Steers,
1975). The idea behind these models is that smooth organizational operations are representative
of organizational effectiveness.
Strategic constituencies is a model that measures organizational effectiveness based on
the satisfaction of important stakeholders (Cameron, 2015). In this case, the stakeholders could
be either internal or external and their interests in the organization could vary dramatically.
Specific examples of stakeholders could be employees and customers of a business or a booster
of a college football program. One issue with effectiveness when applying this model is the
presence of multiple stakeholders that may have differing views on how the organization should
be run (Cameron, 1986). Attempting to appease all stakeholders can be almost impossible, and
under the evaluation of the strategic constituencies model, organizational effectiveness may
suffer.
The final model of organizational effectiveness that was developed by previous scholars
is the abundance model. The abundance model is possibly the widest ranging and adaptable of all
the models, as organizational effectiveness is defined in this case as “producing, flourishing, and
virtuousness” (Cameron, 2015, p. 202). In the abundance model the organization is open to
define what abundance means to them. This is especially helpful for businesses, such as nonprofits, that have goals other than making money. The key to effectively using the abundance
model is again definition, as the characteristics of what that particular organization outlines as
abundance must be clear in order to gauge organizational effectiveness.
Key Performance Indicators
Scholars who have looked to apply organizational effectiveness to their own research line
needed a deep understanding of what comprises effectiveness in their particular setting. An
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understanding of effectiveness in a specific capacity has then allowed scholars to develop criteria
to measure effectiveness (e.g., Lewis et al., 2009; Matthews, 2011). Often, these measurement
criteria are referred to as KPIs. As touched on earlier in Chapter I, KPI is an acronym for key
performance indicator, and these KPIs represent a measurable value that indicates the
effectiveness of an organization in achieving their objectives (Bauer, 2004; Eckerson, 2006).
While there is not a standard set of KPIs to evaluate every organization, there is somewhat of a
science to determining KPIs for a given business. According to Eckerson (2006), when
evaluating a business process through a critical lens, the first items to look at are desired
outcomes of that process, along with any outcomes that may be byproducts. These outcomes and
byproducts, if quantifiable, can then become the KPIs for the business process.
Putting the idea into practice, Burkhart and Spencer (2018) investigated MLB and
whether there was a difference in offensive tendencies between the regular season and
postseason. For this case, by employing the work of previous scholars, the way in which an out
was recorded by a defensive player, the way in which an offensive player reached base, the
frequency of sacrifice plays, and frequency of stolen bases were determined to be the KPIs of
offensive tendencies (Burkhart & Spencer, 2018). Utilizing these KPIs, the difference between
regular season and postseason, in terms of offensive tendencies, could be assessed.
The fundamental takeaways of the above example for conducting a study incorporating
organizational effectiveness are an understanding of the concept being measured (e.g., offensive
tendencies), consultation of previous research to determine the appropriate KPIs, and execution
of a statistical analysis that can answer the desired questions. The current study took this
approach in determining KPIs suitable for measuring organizational effectiveness of the
organizational goals. Furthermore, as a guide for determining the definition of effectiveness for
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the current research, the study employed the goal and abundance models of organizational
effectiveness (Cameron, 2015; Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum, 1957). Therefore, the working
definition of organizational effectiveness in terms of MLB team strategic organizational goals
was achievement of those goals in a manner that causes the organization to flourish.
The remainder of this section discusses each individual KPI included for the current
study. Each of the KPIs for this study acted as a singular dependent variable. Description of these
KPIs provides background and a working definition of each measure. Additionally, explanation
of why each KPI is representative of a facet of organizational effectiveness of an MLB team is
given.
Wins
The primary objective of any given game in an MLB season is to win. This fact is why
many scholars, such as Lewis et al. (2009), have used wins as a representation of organizational
effectiveness of an MLB team. Wins, as a variable, can be expressed in many forms. The
simplest may be the actual number of wins by a team. Winning percentage, which is the number
of wins divided by the total number of games, is also often used. The expression of wins as a
percentage of total games is especially helpful in situations where the total number of games
played by teams being compared are uneven. Other variable forms that winning sometimes takes
are postseason appearances and championship wins, which can be representative of success
depending on organizational goals (Hasan, 2008).
For the current study, wins were a somewhat obvious fit as a measure of effectiveness
when the first independent variable was considered. The first independent variable was a
grouping by an organizational goal of profits or wins. It could be assumed that teams who prefer
wins would most likely win more games over a season than teams who prefer profits (Fort, 2015;
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Zimbalist, 2003). By looking at wins, it could be determined if there was a difference between
the two groups and conclude if one goal is superior to the other in terms of winning games. The
variable form of wins in the current study was the total number of wins in an MLB regular
season by a given team. This choice was based on a desire for inclusion and uniformity. Not all
teams make the postseason. By only including regular season games, it was ensured that each
team observation played the same number of games, and comparisons between teams and
seasons will thus be made much easier.
Revenue
Teams in the MLB are for-profit entities. While it can be debated whether profits or wins
are the primary objective of an MLB organization, it could be said the profits are, at the very
least, an important component of operations. Revenue is closely related to profits, as it represents
all the money made from business activities. Sport scholars regularly study determinants of
revenue, as it is an indicator of a financially healthy MLB team (e.g., Alexander, 2001;
Gustafson & Hadley, 2007). Furthermore, revenue is also linked with the other MLB
organizational effectiveness variables of wins and attendance. As teams win games, attendance
likely increases. As attendance increases so does revenue, and finally increased revenue can be
reinvested back into the team to win more games (Fort & Quirk, 2004; Zimbalist, 2003).
As explained above, revenue is a central part of the operation of an MLB team. This
characteristic is what makes revenue a good fit as a KPI of MLB organizational effectiveness.
Applying the abundance model (Cameron, 2015), a flourishing team would most likely produce
more revenue. When assessing differences in effectiveness of the two organizational goals (i.e.,
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profits or wins), revenue would seem like an appropriate KPI for comparison. Revenue for the
current study was recorded as an inflation-adjusted dollar amount so that revenues from different
years could be fairly compared.
Attendance
Attendance is a variable that is regularly studied in sport literature and teams that are
successful often have better attendance (Coates & Humphreys, 2007; Davis, 2008). In this sense,
attendance is a key indicator of success, and is therefore, a suitable KPI of organizational
effectiveness. One might expect that teams who actively pursue wins and spend more money on
talent acquisition may attract more attendance (Davis, 2008). Similarly, teams pursuing profits
might also desire to increase attendance, as increased attendance would lead to more revenues
and ultimately have a positive impact on profits. Due to the fact that both the profit group and
wins group should desire high attendance, comparing the differences between the two groups
makes for an interesting inquiry.
For the current research, the total home attendance for a team over the entire season was
analyzed. However, MLB stadiums vary in size, so the total attendance numbers could not be
effectively compared from team to team. To account for the difference in stadium capacity, the
average home attendance was divided by the stadium capacity for a given year, which yielded
the percentage of the stadium that was filled for the season. Converting to a percentage then
controlled for differences in stadium capacity and allowed the attendance KPIs of each team to
be compared equitably.
Wage Dispersion
Wage dispersion, or the way in which an organization chooses to distribute their payroll
budget to compensate employees, has often been linked as a contributing factor to the
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performance of an organization (Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller, 1999). The methods by which
wages are distributed can be categorized into one of two groups: equality in pay (Akerlof &
Yellen, 1990) or hierarchical pay (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). However, differing viewpoints exist
on which of the two methods is the most effective form of wage dispersion. The opposing
theories have inspired previous scholars to investigate wage dispersion in the context of MLB
(e.g., Annala & Winfree, 2011; Frick et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2017). Findings of these scholars
have shown that generally an equal pay structure in MLB is linked to more wins. Similarly, wage
dispersion amongst players has also been referred to as partially representative of cohesion and
team chemistry, as equal treatment through pay structure tends to breed a sense of fairness (Hill
et al., 2017).
Gini Coefficient. When discussing wage dispersion in baseball, as well as other contexts,
it is important to define how this variable is measured so that results may be interpreted
correctly, and the implications have more meaning. In sport literature, wage dispersion is
primarily measured using the Gini coefficient (e.g., Annala & Winfree, 2011; Frick et al., 2003).
Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of distribution, developed by Corrado Gini, to gauge
economic inequality among a population (Ceriani & Verme, 2012; Lambert & Aronson, 1993).
According to Lambert and Aronson (1993), the coefficient can range from 0 to 1, with a value of
zero (0) representing perfect wage equality and a value of one (1) representing perfect inequality.
The traditional use of the Gini coefficient has been to measure income or wealth distribution
within a country. A country where one person earned all the income or had all the wealth would
have a Gini coefficient of one (1), and a country where all the income or wealth was distributed
equally among every resident would have a Gini coefficient of zero (0). In sport research, instead
of looking at the Gini coefficient for a country, scholars have used the metric to measure wage
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dispersion amongst a single team (Annala & Winfree, 2011). In this context, a Gini value of zero
(0) would represent all players on the team making the same amount, and a value of one (1)
would mean that one player was paid all the money. By calculating Gini for each individual
team, scholars are then able to make comparisons amongst teams based on their differences in
the wage dispersion metric.
As seen above, the Gini coefficient can be a useful tool for wage dispersion scholars.
However, in order to utilize the metric, one must first know how it is calculated. Chappelow
(2019) explained:
The Gini index is often represented graphically through the Lorenz curve, which shows
income (or wealth) distribution by plotting the population percentile by income on the
horizontal axis and cumulative income on the vertical axis. The Gini coefficient is equal
to the area below the line of perfect equality (0.5 by definition) minus the area below the
Lorenz curve, divided by the area below the line of perfect equality. In other words, it is
double the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality. (para. 5)
Another explanation of the calculation is that Gini coefficient is found by taking the average
absolute difference of all pairs in a population and then dividing by the average. As the Lorenz
curve deviates further from the line of perfect equality, the Gini coefficient becomes higher,
representing less equal wage distribution (Ceriani & Verme, 2012; Lambert & Aronson, 1993).
Therefore, the most basic explanation is that the Gini coefficient measures the deviation from
perfect equality.
Wage dispersion can be a useful KPI for measuring organizational effectiveness in the
MLB for a few reasons. First, for MLB teams pursuing wins, wage dispersion should represent
equality and could be a suitable measure for monitoring goal attainment. Second, with equality in
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pay being linked to team cohesion and team cohesion being related to on-field performance,
wage dispersion is again a good KPI to detect differences in organizational goals. Finally, wage
dispersion can also be linked to utility (i.e., spending efficiency) of MLB teams. Teams who
spend efficiently are less likely to commit a disproportionally large amount of money to a single
player, so wage dispersion can be indicative of utility. Applying wage dispersion and the Gini
coefficient, the current research calculated the Gini coefficient for every MLB team in each year
included in the study. The calculation was then used to analyze the groupings of profits and wins,
as well as the groupings of high or low utility.
Team Experience
Team experience is a variable used exclusively in sport research. It refers to the
cumulative experience that a team possesses. Measurement of team experience can come in
multiple forms including actual age of players, years of service in a league, or years on a
particular team (Berri, 2006; Hill et al., 2017; Krautmann, 2009). The choice of which form of
experience to use is based upon the other variables being studied.
If salary is a variable of interest, age/experience level is often looked at as a determinant
because players start their careers making relatively small salaries. As their experience increases
and they become a proven commodity, then their salary will typically increase. Finally, on the
back end of their careers, player talent and ability begin to decrease and because of the decline,
salary level may decrease as well (Hill et al., 2017).
When winning is a variable in question, team experience also is typically used as a
determinant. Teams with more experience, also sometimes referred to as veteran leadership, will
often times have more success winning than younger teams (Berri, 2006; Hill et al., 2017). In
this case, it is not player age that specifically matters, but instead how long players have been in
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a league. Furthermore, Hill et al. (2017) pointed out that teams who have been together for a
longer period of time have had a better chance to develop team chemistry, and in turn, may have
more success winning.
The current study was concerned with team experience as it is expressed by cumulative
major league service time of all players on an MLB team in a given year. This variable was
calculated for each team in a given year by adding the MLB service time for every player on the
payroll of that team. Teams that have a strategic organizational goal of wins may be more likely
to construct a roster with a greater experience level. However, that roster may be more expensive
but also more likely to win games. Conversely, teams seeking more utility or spending efficiency
may try to identify younger, cheaper talent and will thus have a more inexperienced roster. In
conclusion, team experience seems to be an appropriate organizational effectiveness KPI for the
strategic organizational goals, as well as for the utility gained from spending efficiency.
Cost of Attendance
In sport, cost of attendance refers to how much it costs for a fan to attend a game. Not
only does that include the price of a ticket, but it also includes items such as parking,
concessions, and souvenirs (Coates & Humphreys, 2007; Krautmann & Berri, 2007; Marburger,
1997). If attendance level remains unchanged, a higher cost of attendance will generate more
revenue which will then increase profit. In this case, teams pursuing profits would have a higher
cost of attendance in order to increase their revenues. However, demand also plays a role with
attendance. Attendance generally increases as a team wins more games, and with a higher
demand, a team has the ability to raise their cost of attendance (Coates & Humphreys, 2007).
When calculating cost of attendance for an academic study, one could add each
individual element to arrive at a figure that represents total cost. Alternatively, use of the Fan
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Cost Index (FCI) was suggested by Coates and Humphreys (2007), which would promote
uniformity and comparability across research studies. The FCI is a metric based upon a family of
four attending a game with four average priced tickets, parking for one car, two draft beers, four
soft drinks, four hot dogs, and two team caps. The current study used FCI as a KPI dependent
variable representing the cost of attendance. Differences in FCI were then analyzed based on the
two independent variables of strategic organizational goals and utility.
Franchise Value
The final KPI of organizational effectiveness in the current study was franchise value.
Franchise value in MLB refers to the worth of each team based on the brand value, revenue
streams, and assets (e.g., stadiums; Ozanian & Badenhausen, 2019). In the for-profit sector
where MLB teams operate, franchise or company value acts as a cumulative sum of all business
activities. Companies considered to be effective and prospering (i.e., abundance model;
Cameron, 2015) would be more likely to have a higher valuation. Similarly, those for-profit
companies effectively achieving their goals (i.e., goal attainment; Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum,
1957) would also have higher valuations.
In terms of the current research and MLB teams, the purpose was to look at how
organizational goals for a given year impacted franchise values. Therefore, franchise value was
recorded for each team directly before and after the given year of the study. These before and
after values were then used to calculate percentage change in franchise value for the given year.
According to Alexander and Kern (2004), a strong link exists between team success and higher
franchise value. Teams with a strategic organizational goal of wins may then have a higher
increase in franchise value than those pursuing profits. Similarly, spending more efficiently and
receiving higher utility could be positively correlated with franchise value (Scelles et al., 2016).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The current study focused primarily on differences in strategy and spending in MLB. As
stated in Chapter I, the research questions were focused on differences between levels of
multiple factors and how each level of those factors is related to MLB organizational
effectiveness. The two factors represented multiple strategic goals and spending efficiency, while
MLB organizational effectiveness was represented by seven different KPIs that were identified
in Chapter II.
In order to clearly layout the methods in which this study was conducted, the remainder
of this chapter is divided into the following sections: (1) research model, (2) data and variables,
(3) hypotheses, and (4) statistical analyses. The first section presents and explains a visual
representation of the research model for better understanding of the research study. The next
section describes the data that were collected, along with manipulations that were used to create
the necessary variables. Section three introduces the hypotheses that correspond to each research
question. The final section provides background on and explains the use of the statistical analysis
method.
Research Model
In building the research model, two categorical independent variables, also known as
factors, were first established: (a) strategic organizational goal and (b) utility achieved. Both
factors had two levels (groupings). For strategic organizational goal, the two groupings were
profit and wins, while the two levels of utility achieved were high and low. Then, utilizing the
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work of previous scholars as described in Chapter II, the continuous dependent variables (KPIs)
which represented MLB organizational effectiveness were determined. Finally, two confounding
variables (covariates) of market size and year were explored, with ultimately only the market
size variable being included in the research model.
In justification for market size as a covariate, it would be considered a confounding
variable because teams in larger markets have higher revenue generation potential and more
resources (Alexander & Kern, 2004). An argument can easily be made that these advantages over
smaller market teams could affect both the independent and dependent variables in the study.
Market size measured by the total population of an area would fit the definition of a covariate
because it is continuous in nature (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
The second confounding variable that was considered and then dropped from the current
study was year. Year is sometimes controlled for to account for time-specific fixed effects (e.g.,
Annala & Winfree, 2011; Frick et al., 2003), such as variance from abnormal shocks due to
environmental factors in a given time-period (e.g., financial crisis or work stoppage). However,
in the case of the current study, year as a covariate was found to violate the linearity assumption
meaning that the year variable did not have a linear relationship with other covariate and
dependent variables. A violation of linearity causes curvilinearity which can severely reduce the
power of the significance test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Due to this violation, a minimal
contribution to the further explanation of variance, and the recommendation of Tabachnick and
Fidell (2013) to limit the number of covariates in order to preserve degrees of freedom, it was
decided to not include year as a covariate in the research model.
Based on the above outlined variables, Figure 3.1 displays the research model. Please
note that all KPIs are separate, dependent variables. While they are all included together in one
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circle, this does not mean that they make up one single variable. The circle is just included to
signify that the KPIs together represent the concept of organizational effectiveness for an MLB
team. The circle also simplifies the model, as an arrow does not have to be drawn from each
independent variable to every dependent variable.
Figure 3.1
Research Model

Data and Variables
In order to investigate the relationship illustrated in Figure 3.1, data for MLB franchises
were collected and analyzed for all seasons between 2010 and 2019. Each of the 30 MLB teams
in a given season of the study constituted a team-year observation. Thus, with the study spanning
10 total seasons, and every team from the timespan included in the data set, the study had a
population size of 300.
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For each team-year observation, the data pertaining to each variable was manually
collected from multiple sources. It should be noted that, when necessary, financial data were
adjusted to 2019 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation calculator (https://
data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl). By adjusting the applicable values, it made for more reasonable
comparisons. Furthermore, for convenience, each of the ten variables and their descriptions are
listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Variable List
Variable

Description

Strategic Organizational
Goal (SOG)

Two-level factor (Profit, Win) determined by profit margin.
Higher margins are grouped as profits and lower margins are wins.

Utility Achieved (UA)

Two-level factor (High, Low) determined by money spent per win.
Less money spent equals high utility and more spent equals low.

Wins (WIN)

Regular season wins.

Revenues (REV)

Money generated from business operations.

Attendance (ATT)

Percentage of home stadium that is filled for the year.

Wage Dispersion (WD)

Gini coefficient for a team’s payroll in a season.

Team Experience (TE)

Total league service time for all players on an MLB roster.

Cost of Attendance (CA)

Fan Cost Index (FCI) for a team in a given year.

Franchise Value (FV)

Valuation of team worth.

Market Population (MP)

Covariate representing population of team’s metropolitan area.
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Independent Variables
Starting with the first independent variable (SOG), which was the factor concerning
strategic organizational goals and the groupings of profits and wins, operating income and
revenue data were collected from the Forbes website (https://www.forbes.com/mlbvaluations/list/). Using that data, profit margins for each team-year observation were then
calculated by dividing operating incomes by revenues. Each observation was then grouped into
profit (higher margin) or wins (lower margin) based on their profit margin. It should be noted
that the line for determining the profit or win grouping was the mean profit margin for the data
set (9.0%).
The second independent variable (UA) was a factor with two levels. This factor
represented the utility achieved through spending efficiency, and the levels are designated as
high and low. Data for team payroll and wins were collected from MLB team websites, which
was then used to calculate a variable representing money spent per win (team payroll/wins). To
determine the groupings of each team-year observation, the calculated metric was compared to
the average for the dataset ($1.54 million). Those teams spending more than average per win
were placed in the low utility group, and those spending less than average were categorized as
high utility.
Dependent Variables
The seven dependent variables in the current study were KPIs which have been
determined to represent organizational effectiveness of MLB teams. Two of the KPIs, number of
wins (WIN) and amount of team experience (TE), were collected from MLB team websites. The
WIN variable was strictly the number of wins for the regular season for each team-year
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observation. The total service time for every player on the payroll of a team in a given year
represented TE, and this was found by summing the entire service time column on an MLB
roster.
The next two KPIs, amount of revenue (REV) and yearly franchise values (FV), were
collected for each team-year observation from the Forbes website. REV was represented by an
inflation-adjusted dollar amount recorded at the end of the MLB season with the intention of
seeing the impacts on the independent variables on revenue for a given year. Data for the FV
variable were also collected at the end of each season, and then using the FV from the previous
season, the percentage change from year-to-year was calculated. Using the percentage change
helped control for historical factors (e.g., length of franchise existence) when comparing dollar
values that varied drastically between teams (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Davis, 2008). Similarly,
the KPI cost to attend games (CA), represented by inflation-adjusted FCI, was obtained from the
well-known sport database Rodney Fort’s Sports Business Data
(https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/ codes).
Another KPI was a measure of the attendance for each team at home games (ATT). For
the current study, ATT was expressed as the percentage of the stadium filled so that stadiums of
differing capacities could be compared. For each team-year observation, average attendance in a
given year were collected on the ESPN website (http://www.espn.com/mlb/attendance) and the
capacity of a team’s home stadium for a single game was determined on Ballparks of Baseball
(https://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/). The average attendance was then divided by the stadium
capacity to give the percentage of the stadium that was filled for a team in a given season.
Finally, the dispersion of wages amongst a team roster (WD) was another KPI that
required some calculation. First, for each team-year observation, the salaries of every player on

40
the MLB team payroll were collected from MLB team websites. Then the Gini coefficient were
calculated and transferred to the dataset as the WD variable.
Covariate
There was also a covariate included in the proposed study. By definition, a covariate must
be either a continuous, ordinal, or dichotomous variable. Populations of MLB team markets
(MP), which is a continuous variable, was the included covariate. The current study defined the
market for a team as the combined metropolitan area in which the team was located. Thus, for
each team-year observation the corresponding combined metropolitan area population was
recorded using the website of the United States Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/metro-micro/data/tables.html). For areas that had two MLB teams (e.g., New
York), the population was split in half based on the assumption that individuals are likely not
active supporters of both teams (Mills et al., 2016).
Bringing all the variables of the study together, the following two-way MANCOVA
additive model is given:

where
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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{ 𝑝𝑗 }
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i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2,…,nij,

(7)

Ypij is the kth observation of an organizational effectiveness KPI in the ijth cell, respecting
to level i of the factor strategic organizational goal and level j of the utility achieved.
µp is the global means of the activity of all KPIs.
τpi is the effects of the ith treatment of the factor strategic organizational goal.
δpj is the effects of the jth treatment of the factor utility achieved.
γpij is the effects of the interaction between strategic organizational goal and utility
received.
Xijk denotes the block effect vector of the covariate market population.
εpijk is the random error.
*Note that the additive properties of equation 7 mean that seven equations (one for each
dependent variable) are included to arrive at the cumulative total.
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Delimitations
While the current study was extensive, it was not without delimitations. The first
delimitation was the chosen data frame of 2010 to 2019. This data frame allowed for a large
enough population size (N = 300) to conduct the desired statistical tests, while not risking
including data from times where economic conditions, and therefore variable relationships, may
have been quite different. However, by limiting the data frame to only as far back as 2010, the
study did not gain much of a historical perspective on the issue. Furthermore, the power level
supplied by the population of 300 in the data only allowed for two levels on each independent
variable, when three actually may have been supported and preferred.
A second delimitation was the choice of MLB as the setting for the research. The choice
was made to keep the size of the study manageable, but the findings are only applicable in
baseball and are not generalizable to other sports. Similarly, the choice of KPIs to represent
organizational effectiveness also limits generalizability. Those KPIs are specific to
organizational effectiveness of MLB teams, so connections to other settings or even other facets
of an MLB franchise cannot be made.
Finally, the manner in which the strategic organizational goal was determined for an
organization was admittedly simplistic and flawed. However, with very little previous research to
use as a guide, this part of the study is somewhat exploratory. The potential for the methods and
findings to be incorporated in more advanced models in the future is viable and encouraged.
Hypotheses
With a model in place and the variables identified, the research questions could then be
better understood and analyzed. The premise of Q1 was to examine the organizational goal of an
MLB team individually, while Q2 did the same with utility achieved. Conversely, Q3 tested for
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interaction effect of the two independent variables to see if the simultaneous joint effect on one
or more dependent variables was significantly different than the sum of its parts. Table 3.2 lists
each research question and its corresponding hypothesis, which is based on the framework and
theory outlined by the review of literature in Chapter II.
Table 3.2
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Q#

Research Question

H# Hypothesis

Q1

Is there a difference between a primary
MLB organizational goal of wins versus
a primary organizational goal of profits
in terms of KPIs representing
organizational effectiveness?

H1 There is a difference in at least one
organizational effectiveness KPI for
MLB teams with a primary goal of wins
as opposed to MLB teams with a
primary goal of profits.

Q2

Is there a difference in levels of utility
achieved through spending efficiency by
MLB teams as measured by the KPIs
signifying organizational effectiveness?

H2 There is a difference in at least one
organizational effectiveness KPI for
MLB teams who achieve high utility as
opposed to those with a low level.

Q3

Is there an interaction effect between
primary MLB organizational goals and
spending efficiency in terms of their
relationship with the organizational
effectiveness KPIs?

H3 An interaction effect exists between
primary MLB organizational goals and
spending efficiency when it comes to at
least one organizational effectiveness
KPI.

Statistical Analyses
To answer the above research questions and test the proposed hypotheses, the current
study implemented a two-way MANCOVA. This statistical method is used to assess the
differences on multiple continuous dependent variables by multiple independent variables
containing levels, all while controlling for covariates (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). According to
Ramos et al. (2012), by adding covariates to a model, their effect is eliminated from the
relationship between the independent grouping variables and the continuous dependent variables.
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Additionally, appropriate covariates also reduce the error term because they can help further
explain variance. Another feature of MANCOVA is the ability to test for interaction between
multiple independent groupings. An interaction effect occurs when the combination of two
factors causes a simultaneous joint effect on one or more dependent variables that is significantly
different than the sum of its parts (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
MANCOVA Assumptions
After the data were collected, the first step of statistical analysis was to check the
assumptions of MANCOVA. The MANCOVA assumptions are: (a) independent random
sampling, (b) independent variables are categorical, (c) dependent variables and covariates are
continuous, ordinal, or dichotomous, (d) independence of observations, € no outliers (f) absence
of multicollinearity, (g) multivariate normality, (g) homogeneity of variance, and (h)
homogeneity of covariances. For the current study, the assumption of independent random
sampling would not be applicable because the dataset is actually a population. Both independent
variables are categorical factors with two levels, while the dependent variables and covariate
were all continuous.
As for independence of observations, this assumption was somewhat violated. However,
this was not detrimental to the current study and is actually quite common in sport research.
Within a given season, teams are paired together in games with one team winning and one team
losing. All teams within the league have influence on others for whether games are won or lost,
and thus the league average winning percentage will always be .50 (Berri, 2006). Additionally,
over multiple seasons, data from the same organization will be collected multiple times. One
possibility for dealing with sport research that examines organizations over time is to treat it as
panel data, which allows multiple data points from the same individual to analyzed
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longitudinally (e.g., Annala & Winfree, 2011). Alternatively, some would argue that a sport
franchise over multiple seasons is not panel data because that team does not have the exact same
make-up year after year (e.g., roster changes). Under this school of thought, the recommendation
is to treat each team-year observation from the same franchise as an individual subject, and deal
with the violation of lack of independence for game outcome by using careful consideration
when interpreting results (Hill et al., 2017; Mondello & Maxcy, 2009). The current study chose
the latter suggestion, foregoing the use of panel data, and carefully interpreting win-loss
outcomes with an understanding that inter-team influence exists through direct competition.
The assumption of no outliers was another instance where a violation occurred. To detect
outliers within the collected data set, Mahalanobis distance, which is based on the chi-square
distribution, was used to find the distance between each point and the distribution within a
multivariate space (Leys et al., 2018). For the current study, the Mahalanobis distance was
assessed using p < .001 and degrees of freedom equal to the number of dependent variables in
the model (7). This yielded a critical value of 24.32, and four cases exceeded this value which
made them outliers (2013 Astros, 2013 Marlins, 2014 Giants, & 2018 Yankees). Per
recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2013), these four cases were removed due the
sensitivity of MANCOVA to outliers.
Absence of multicollinearity was checked using correlations between dependent
variables. The largest value in the correlation matrix occurred between the variables of Wins and
Team Experience (r = .60). This correlation value was acceptable as no correlation should
exceed r = .80 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), indicating that no violations of the multicollinearity
assumption occurred. Table 3.3 provides the full correlation matrix for the absence of
multicollinearity assumption. Similarly, there was no violation of the multivariate normality
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assumption, as multivariate normality can be assumed with a large enough sample size (>20 per
level of independent variables) due to the Central Limit Theorem (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
Table 3.3
Correlation Matrix
WIN

REV

ATT

WD

TE

CA

WIN

1.000

REV

.347

1.000

ATT

.422

.534

1.000

WD

-.115

.201

.063

1.000

TE

.602

.401

.489

-.076

1.000

CA

.065

.561

.291

.217

.266

1.000

FV

.141

-.028

.108

.021

.075

-.039

FV

1.000

Note. Values above r = .8 indicate concerns for multicollinearity.
The assumption homogeneity of variance was checked with Levene’s test (Table 3.4),
which when returning a significant value (α = .05) is considered to have violated the assumption.
In the case of the current study the variable Franchise Value was significant (α = <.001). Allen
and Bennett (2007) suggested that when the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated,
the likelihood of type I error is increased. However, if only one dependent variable violates the
assumption it is acceptable to continue and evaluate the corresponding univariate ANOVAs at a
stricter alpha level (i.e., α = .01). The current study implemented this guidance and chose to
include Franchise Value as a variable, albeit with cautious evaluation.
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Table 3.4
Levene’s Test
F

df1

df2

p-value

WIN

1.669

3

291

.174

REV

.423

3

291

.737

ATT

.718

3

291

.542

WD

.304

3

291

.822

TE

1.870

3

291

.135

CA

1.527

3

291

.208

FV

6.514

3

291

.000*

Note. *α = .05.
Finally, homogeneity of covariance was assessed using Box’s M-Test (Table 3.5). This
test is considered to be highly sensitive to discrepancies in cell sample sizes, and consequently,
significance is often interpreted at the α = .001 level (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Even with a
violation of Box’s M, proceeding to the MACOVA analysis is considered acceptable. The only
recommendation is that Pillai’s Trace should be the chosen test statistic to interpret, as it is the
most conservative when compared to the alternatives (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In the case of
the current study, a significance value of p = .005 was calculated for Box’s M, signifying there
was no violation and all MANCOVA test statistics could be considered.
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Table 3.5
Box’s M-Test
F
Box’s M

135.349

F

1.437

df1

84

df2

128815.1

p-value

.005

Note. α = .001.
Power Analysis
The next step after checking assumptions was to assess the power of the analysis.
Utilizing G*Power 3.1.9.2, a post hoc power analysis for the main effects of the proposed twoway MANCOVA was conducted. With specifications set at a medium effect size and a sample
size of 300, an estimated power of .94 was yielded. A power of .94 is acceptable as it exceeds the
desired threshold of .80 in most research (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Once the power analysis
was complete, descriptive statistics were calculated using R version 3.6.3 to provide a better
visualization of the dataset.
MANCOVA Analysis
The final step of statistical analysis in the proposed study was to perform the
MANCOVA to address the research questions. Again, employing R version 3.6.3, the
MANCOVA function was run to produce Pillai’s trace statistic, Wilks Lambda, LawleyHotelling trace statistic, and Roy’s largest root for comparison of between-group and withingroup variance. All four test statistics are intended for the same general purpose with all of them
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being similarly tested against the F-distribution for significance. However, Olson (1976)
delineated between the test statistics with the explanation that Pillai’s trace may be best for
general use due to its comparatively conservative and robust nature, Wilk’s Lambda and LawleyHotelling can be sensitive to violations of homogeneity of covariance in smaller samples, and
Roy’s largest root may be the most likely to produce Type I errors. For the current study, Pillai’s
trace was chosen for interpretation of significance based on its robust and conservative nature
regarding assumption violations, which fit well with the exploratory nature of the research
(Olson, 1974, 1976). The remaining three test statistics were also reported to provide further
insight into the results.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of the current research was to investigate MLB team organizational goals
(i.e., Profit or Wins), spending efficiency (i.e., utility achieved), and various organizational KPIs.
As stated in Chapter III, a MANCOVA was used to analyze the relationship of the two
independent factors with the dependent KPI variables. The intention was to create a better
understanding of the possible ancillary effects of the varying organizational strategies.
The results of the statistical analyses are presented in Chapter IV and are split into the
following sections: (1) descriptive statistics, (2) MANCOVA, and (3) univariate ANOVAs. The
descriptive statistics are meant to provide a summary of the nature and structure of the data
(Fisher & Marshall, 2009). Output for the MANCOVA shows the effect of independent factor
variables on the entire combination of dependent variables, when controlling for the covariate.
Finally, the univariate ANOVAs show the effect of each factor on the individual dependent
variables, also while adjusting for the covariate (Ramos et al., 2012).
Descriptive Statistics
The first portion of the descriptive statistics was an analysis of the independent variables
(factors). As explained in Chapter II, the first factor (SOG) had two levels, profit and win. Teams
were assigned to the win category when their profit margin was <9% and assigned to the profit
category when their margin was >9%. The second factor (UA) also had two levels (low & high),
and teams were assigned to the categories based on their relative position to the average dollars
spent per win ($1,540,296.50) for the data set. Teams spending over the average were assigned
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to the low category and teams spending under were assigned to high. After using Mahalanobis
distance to identify and remove outliers (Leys et al., 2018), there were 296 team-year
observations left in the data set. Table 4.1 displays the distribution of the 296 observations on
each of the two independent factors.
Table 4.1
Between-Subjects Factors
Factor

Level

N

SOG

Win

144

Profit

152

Low

132

High

164

UA

Note. N = 296.
The next step in summarizing the data was to calculate the mean (M), standard deviation
(SD), and sample size (N) for each dependent variable (KPI) and its combinations with the two
independent factors. Table 4.2 shows the summary data, with column one indicating the
dependent variable, columns two and three showing the factors (i.e., SOG & UA), and columns
three through five presenting the summary statistics. Along with providing a description of the
data, the means of the various combinations of factors and dependent variables can be used to
assist with the determination of effect direction when significance is found within the
MANCOVA and univariate ANOVA analyses (Bedeian, 2014). The N column also reiterates the
application of the Central Limit Theorem to the assumption of multivariate normality for
MANCOVA, which was discussed in Chapter III, as every combination of dependent and
independent variables exceeded the threshold of 20 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics
DV
WIN

SOG
Win

Profit

Total

REV
(in millions)

Win

Profit

Total

ATT

Win

Profit

Total

WD

Win

Profit

Total

UA
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total
Low
High
Total

M
80.65
83.43
82.49
80.40
78.48
79.56
80.49
81.52
81.06
295.72
297.17
296.35
283.16
280.61
281.47
290.87
286.97
288.71
.70
.68
.69
.67
.69
.68
.69
.68
.69
.58
.59
.59
.57
.57
.57
.58
.58
.58

SD
12.00
11.93
11.97
9.35
12.24
11.39
11.01
12.32
11.75
90.45
87.28
89.08
81.66
90.44
87.60
87.37
89.60
88.64
.18
.15
.17
.18
.18
.18
.18
.17
.18
.06
.06
.06
.05
.06
.06
.06
.06
.06

N
81
63
144
51
101
152
132
164
296
81
63
144
51
101
152
132
164
296
81
63
144
51
101
152
132
164
296
81
63
144
51
101
152
132
164
296
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Table 4.2, continued
DV
SOG
TE
Win

UA
M
SD
N
Low
159.25
22.75
81
High
159.24
23.04
63
Total
159.24
22.87
144
Profit
Low
153.68
27.45
51
High
152.57
28.06
101
Total
153.19
27.63
152
Total
Low
155.83
25.79
132
High
156.68
25.26
164
Total
156.30
25.43
296
CA
Win
Low
216.06
46.78
81
High
220.88
60.60
63
Total
218.18
53.13
144
Profit
Low
219.97
51.58
51
High
205.07
50.34
101
Total
210.07
51.08
152
Total
Low
217.57
48.53
132
High
211.14
54.87
164
Total
214.01
52.15
296
FV
Win
Low
.21
.20
81
High
.15
.16
63
Total
.17
.18
144
Profit
Low
.11
.13
51
High
.15
.15
101
Total
.13
.14
152
Total
Low
.15
.17
132
High
.15
.16
164
Total
.15
.16
296
Note. The M and SD of REV are interpreted in millions of dollars.
Multivariate Analysis of Covariance
The main purpose of conducting a MANCOVA analysis is to analyze the relationships of
independent factors with dependent variables, all while controlling for covariates (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2013). In the case of the current study, market population (MP) was used as the lone
covariate in the model in order to see if the factors (SOG & UA) had effects on the dependent
variables beyond the effect of MP. Sweet and Grace-Martin (2012) suggested that when the
covariate is a measured variable (e.g., MP), it is good practice to also report estimated marginal
means along with the standard descriptive statistics. Estimated marginal means are produced via
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the model and offer insight into the effect of the covariate that can be helpful with interpretation
of results. The difference with estimated marginal means is that they are calculated using the
mean value of the covariate which can cause a slight adjustment from the raw means (Sweet &
Grace-Martin, 2012). Table 4.3 provides the estimated marginal means calculated at the mean
value of MP, which was 3,993,725.78.
Table 4.3
Estimated Marginal Means
95% Confidence Int.
Level
Ma
SE
Lower
Upper
Win
81.99
0.99
80.03
83.96
Profit
79.42
0.97
77.51
81.34
REV
Win
296.02
6.54
283.14
308.90
(in millions)
Profit
280.54
6.69
267.37
293.72
ATT
Win
.69
.02
.660
.72
Profit
.68
.02
.648
.71
WD
Win
.59
.01
.58
.60
Profit
.57
.01
.56
.58
TE
Win
159.00
2.08
154.92
163.09
Profit
153.05
2.03
149.05
157.04
CA
Win
218.27
4.03
210.35
226.19
Profit
211.88
4.12
203.78
219.98
FV
Win
.18
.01
.15
.21
Profit
.13
.01
.11
.16
UA
WIN
Low
80.46
1.04
78.42
82.50
High
80.95
0.93
79.12
82.79
REV
Low
287.59
6.97
273.88
301.30
(in millions)
High
288.98
6.25
276.67
301.29
ATT
Low
.68
.02
.65
.71
High
.68
.01
.66
.71
WD
Low
.58
.01
.57
.59
High
.58
.00
.57
.59
TE
Low
156.13
2.16
151.88
160.38
High
155.92
1.94
152.10
159.74
CA
Low
217.14
4.29
208.71
225.57
High
213.01
3.85
205.44
220.59
FV
Low
.16
.01
.13
.19
High
.15
.01
.13
.18
a
Note. M is adjusted for the covariate value of MP = 3,993,725.78.
Factor
SOG

DV
WIN
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After compiling descriptive statistics to provide context for the results, the next step was
to perform the MANCOVA to investigate the multivariate effects of the research model. The
results from this analysis are listed in Table 4.4. For each of the of the independent variables,
covariate, and interaction, four test statistics (Pillai’s trace, Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s trace, &
Roy’s largest root) were reported, with Pillai’s trace being used for interpretation of significance.
Table 4.4
MANCOVA
Effect
Intercept

Test
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
MP
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
SOG
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
UA
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
SOG*UA Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Note. α levels: ** .001; * .05.

F
.98
.02
45.65
45.65
.30
.70
.43
.43
.06
.94
.07
.07
.01
.99
.01
.01
.05
.95
.05
.05

df
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Error df
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285
285

p-value
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
<.001**
.012*
.012*
.012*
.012*
.98
.98
.98
.98
.049*
.049*
.049*
.049*

ηp2
.98
.98
.98
.98
.30
.30
.30
.30
.06
.06
.06
.06
.01
.01
.01
.01
.05
.05
.05
.05

The multivariate results displayed above show significant values for the SOG factor, the
SOG*UA interaction, and the MP covariate. In terms of SOG, this significant finding indicates
that, after controlling for the covariate, there was a significant difference between the MLB team
organizational goals (i.e., profit & win) for the group of dependent variables (KPIs) as a whole.
Furthermore, the relatively equivalent values of Hotelling’s trace and Roy’s largest root for SOG
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most likely imply that the effect is predominantly associated with just a few of the dependent
variables (Olson, 1974). The significance of the interaction variable denotes that the effects of
each factor were different at each level of the other factor across the combination of dependent
variables in the model. Finally, the significance of MP suggests that market population was a
significant predictor of the organizational effectiveness KPIs, and that those KPIs were adjusted
accordingly (reflected by estimated marginal means).
Applying these results to the research questions and hypotheses outlined in Chapter III,
H1 was supported as there was evidence of a significant difference between an MLB strategic
organizational goal of wins versus a strategic organizational goal of profit. In terms of H2, no
significant difference in level of utility achieved (high, low) was found, which would not support
the research hypothesis. Last, H3 was supported as a significant interaction effect occurred in the
research model.
Univariate Analysis of Variances
While a MANCOVA analysis provides multivariate results and understanding of a
research model, it is often also necessary to calculate univariate ANOVAs to gain a more
intuitive understanding of individual relationships within the data (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2012;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The current research took this approach by calculating univariate
ANOVAs for each of the two factors (SOG & UA), the interaction of the factors (SOG*UA), and
the covariate (MP) to investigate their effects on each of the individual dependent variables.
Supplementing this analysis with the descriptive statistics and estimated marginal means,
significant differences between groups and the directionality of those differences was
determined. Table 4.5 contains the analyses of the univariate ANOVAs.
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Table 4.5
Univariate ANOVAs
Source
DV
Corrected WIN
Model
REV
ATT
WD
TE
CA
FV
Intercept WIN
REV
ATT
WD
TE
CA
FV
MP
WIN
REV
ATT
WD
TE
CA
FV
SOG
WIN
REV
ATT
WD
TE
CA
FV
UA
WIN
REV
ATT
WD
TE
CA
FV

Type-III SS
1564.17a
5.59E17b
.34c
.04d
20879.12e
134160.04f
.32g
381508.80
2.68E18
24.03
19.70
1244815.29
1950956.48
1.56
533.80
5.43E17
.32
.03
18129.95
120960.08
.00
510.26
1.66E16
.01
.01
2454.75
2827.62
.17
16.67
1.34E14
.00
.00
3.01
1177.49
.00

df
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

MS
391.04
1.40E17
.09
.01
5219.78
33540.01
.08
381508.80
2.68E18
24.03
19.70
1244815.29
1950956.48
1.56
533.80
5.43E17
.32
.03
18129.95
120960.08
.00
510.26
1.66E16
.01
.01
2454.75
2827.62
.17
16.67
1.34E14
.00
.00
3.01
1177.49
.00

F
2.91
23.04
2.87
3.26
8.94
14.61
3.16
2835.76
441.34
802.61
6571.82
2131.59
849.62
62.16
3.97
89.42
10.82
8.97
31.05
52.68
.01
3.88
3.89
.33
3.86
4.20
1.23
6.81
.12
.02
.01
.45
.01
.51
.09

p-value
.022*
<.001***
.024*
.012*
<.001***
<.001***
.015
<.001***
<.001***
<.001***
<.001***
<.001***
<.001***
<.001***
.047*
<.001***
.001***
.003**
<.001***
<.001***
.91
.049*
.049*
.57
.050*
.041*
.27
.010**
.725
.882
.908
.503
.943
.475
.771

ηp2
.04
.24
.04
.04
.11
.17
.04
.91
.60
.73
.96
.88
.75
.18
.01
.24
.04
.03
.10
.15
.00
.01
.01
.00
.01
.01
.00
.02
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
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Table 4.5, continued
Source
DV
Type-III SS
df
MS
F
p-value
ηp2
SOG*UA WIN
546.95
1
546.95
3.99
.047*
.03
REV
1.64E15
1
1.64E15
.27
.60
.001
ATT
.02
1
.02
.80
.37
.00
WD
3.49E-5
1
3.49E-5
.01
.91
.000
TE
223.64
1
223.64
.38
.54
.00
CA
3013.60
1
3013.60
1.31
.25
.00
FV
.18
1
.18
7.07
.008**
.02
Total
WIN
39149.61
291
134.54
REV
1.77E18
291
6.07E15
ATT
8.71
291
.03
WD
.87
291
.00
TE
169939.12 291
583.98
CA
668214.66 291
2296.27
FV
7.30
291
.03
Corrected WIN 1985849.00 296
Total
REV
2.70E18
296
ATT
147.98
296
WD
100.39
296
TE
7422069.00 296
CA
1.44e7
296
FV
14.33
296
Note.
α levels: ***.001; ** .01; * .05.
FV is interpreted at α = .01 due to significant result from Levene’s Test
a. R Squared = .038 (Adjusted R Squared = .025)
b. R Squared = .241 (Adjusted R Squared = .230)
c. R Squared = .038 (Adjusted R Squared = .025)
d. R Squared = .043 (Adjusted R Squared = .030)
e. R Squared = .109 (Adjusted R Squared = .097)
f. R Squared = .167 (Adjusted R Squared = .156)
g. R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R Squared = .028)

Similar to the MANCOVA results, the univariate ANOVAs produced significant values
for the SOG, SOG*UA, and MP variables. The significance of the covariate, MP, indicates that
market population is significantly associated with changes in values of all the KPIs except
franchise value. In regard to SOG, five dependent variables (WIN, REV, WD, TE, & FV) were
found to be significant, and in all cases, the strategic organizational goal of wins (vs. profits) had
significantly higher values for those KPIs. For the interaction (SOG*UA), there were significant
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values for WIN and FV. Utilizing Table 4.2, it can be observed that teams with a strategic
organizational goal of wins and high utility achieved (Win-High) had the most average wins at
83.43, which was followed by the Win-Low (80.65), Profit-Low (80.40), and Profit-High (78.48)
groups. As for franchise value, teams that employed the strategic organizational goal of wins,
coupled with low utility, experience the largest average increase in franchise value (.21). This
was followed by Win-High (.15), Profit-High (.15), and then Profit-Low (.11).
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Major League Baseball provides a unique setting for investigating the impact of varying
strategic organizational goals and levels of utility maximization on team KPIs. Insight into these
relationships can aid in understanding differing organizational management strategies and their
associated implications. The results of the statistical analyses in Chapter IV, when combined
with the theoretical framework of Chapter II, indicate generalizable expectations for MLB
organizations when certain strategies are employed.
The purpose of Chapter V is to explore the results of the current study, while applying the
context of previous scholars, to help explain the relationships of strategic organizational goals
and utility maximization to the operation of an MLB franchise. The breakdown of this chapter
begins with an in-depth analysis of individual KPIs based on each factor, followed by a
presentation of overall conclusions and implications. Finally, the chapter concludes with
suggestions of avenues for future research.
Organizational Factors and Outcomes
Wins
The first KPI dependent variable in the current research was the number of regularseason wins by a team in a given year. According to Késenne (2006) a team that is attempting to
maximize their wins in a season would spend a larger portion of their available budget than those
attempting to maximize their profits. Under that assertion, the current research used profit
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margin to separate win-maximizing teams from their profit-maximizing counterparts. Similarly,
teams were also divided by their spending efficiency into low and high utility groups.
Strategic Organizational Goal
Teams that were categorized as part of the WM group averaged almost three more wins
per season than teams in the PM group (82.49 to 79.56). As indicated by the univariate ANOVA
(Table 4.5), this difference was statistically significant. Therefore, it could be said that a WM
strategy, as opposed to a PM strategy, is likely to result in more regular season wins. Analyzing
this result from a purely logical standpoint, the finding that a team spending more money with a
purpose of winning would, in fact, win more games than a team spending less in order to
maximize profits seems to make sense. Previous scholars and their findings corroborate this
conclusion, as Clopton (2013) reported that teams with WM spending habits are likely to win
more games than their counterparts. Similarly, Késenne (2006) suggested that teams pursuing
wins will spend more money to maximize the amount of talent on their roster.
Conversely, the finding that a PM strategy would likely yield less regular season wins
than WM also appears to be supported. Teams concerned with profits tend to exhibit tendencies
that are conducive to saving money (El-Hodiri & Quirk, 1971). With team payroll being one of
the largest and most varied expenses for MLB organizations, some teams will attempt to limit
payroll, even at the expense of wins, in order to increase profit and stay within budget (Annala &
Winfree, 2011; Késenne, 2010). By limiting expenses, profit margin is increased. However, with
less money spent on payroll, it is likely that a team’s talent level would be relatively lower,
which would probably result in a fewer number of wins.
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Utility
In the current study, utility achieved (i.e., high or low), by itself, was not a significant
predictor of regular season wins. In other words, the amount spent per win did not have a
significant effect on the overall number of games won. Utility achieved is relative to the amount
of money spent and the number of wins achieved. Two teams could have the same level of
utility, while one of those teams spent less and won less and the other team spent more but won
more. An example of this would be the 2019 Minnesota Twins and the 2019 Cincinnati Reds.
The Twins had a $121.3 million payroll and won 101 games, while the Reds had an $89.3
million payroll and won 75 games. Both teams spent about $1.2 million per win, putting them in
the high utility group of the current study. However, the Twins won 26 more games than the
Reds. This scenario illustrates why utility, in terms of wins and payroll, would not necessarily
dictate the number of regular season games a team won in that season.
Another possible explanation for the non-significant relationship between utility achieved
and regular season wins in the current study can be attributed to cost of players based on track
record. Younger players typically cost less than more experienced players due to development
and merit of achievements (Hill et al., 2017). As players on a team develop, the team could begin
to have success winning with younger, cheaper players (e.g., higher utility). However, with more
success and development, those players will then command higher salaries as they are eligible
for new contracts. Then, even if they win many games, it will come at a higher cost for the team,
and therefore less utility (Dietl et al., 2011). An example could be the 2015 and 2016 Chicago
Cubs. Adjusted for inflation to 2019 dollars, the 2015 Cubs won 97 games and spent $125.4
million ($1.3 million per win), while the 2016 Cubs won 103 games and spent $177.9 million
($1.7 million per win). With many of the same players on the roster and a similar win total, the
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Cubs still had a significant increase in money spent per win from 2015 to 2016 and consequently
moved from the high to low group in utility achieved for the current study.
While utility (payroll per win) alone had no discernable effect on regular season wins,
when combined with strategic organizational goal, the current research found a significant
relationship. This is evidenced by the significant value reported for the interaction variable
(SOG*UA) and the WIN dependent variable in the univariate ANOVA. As mentioned in Chapter
IV, the strategic organizational goal of wins paired with the high utility achieved (Win-High) had
the highest average wins, while the combination of Profit-High had the lowest average. WinHigh teams pursue wins while spending their available budget efficiently, which could be
positioning them for both present and future success in winning games (Fort, 2015; Zimbalist,
2003). MLB teams with larger budgets, who are willing to spend large portions of those budgets
(i.e., less profit margin), and spend that money efficiently (i.e., high utility) are therefore most
likely going to be the most successful teams in terms of winning games. This finding seems to fit
well with the data set, as many of the teams with repeated winning success throughout the 2010s
appear in the current study categorized as Win-High (e.g., Boston Red Sox, Houston Astros, &
Los Angeles Dodgers). Organizations attempting to duplicate the blueprint for positioning a team
to have the best chance to win as many games as possible would therefore spend most of, if not
all their available budget, leaving them with little to zero profit margin. Concurrently, the team
would also want to spend that money as efficiently as possible by strategically selecting players
that could best help their team win.
In contrast, Profit-High teams pursue profits while spending their available budget highly
efficiently. This profile fits teams with lower budgets who may not always have the luxury of
pursuing wins due to financial constraints (Fort & Quirk, 2004; Terrien et al., 2017).
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Organizations in the current study who regularly appeared in the Profit-High category (e.g.,
Baltimore Orioles, Miami Marlins, & Tampa Bay Rays) are teams who, during the 2010s, would
seem to fit the lower budget and less games won description.
Revenue
Strategic Organizational Goal
When analyzing the relationship of strategic organizational goal and revenue, the current
study attempted to answer the question of whether WM or PM would yield more revenue for an
MLB organization. The significant result reported from the univariate ANOVA between SOG
and REV indicated that there was a significant difference between the WM group ($296.4
million) and PM group ($281.5 million) in terms of revenue. It is probable that future teams
would generate more revenue by implementing a WM strategy versus PM.
The idea that a WM strategy would likely produce more revenue is supported by previous
scholars. Fort and Quirk (2004) indicated that differentiation in revenue among teams can at least
partially be linked to varying amounts of interest that teams generate. Interest in a team can be
generated in multiple ways including acquiring talented and noteworthy players, putting a quality
team on the field, and offering an attractive fan experience (Alexander, 2001; Coates &
Humphreys, 2007). With more interest, fans are more likely to attend games and spend money,
which will then have a positive impact on revenue (Gustafson & Hadley, 2007; Marburger,
1997). As established earlier in Chapter V, teams in the WM group of the current study were
likely to win more games than those teams in the PM group. Teams that win more games also
generally garner more interest (Alexander, 2001), and therefore would be expected to generate
more revenue. An example from the data set of the current study that would likely fit this
scenario would be the 2017 and 2018 Seattle Mariners. The 2017 Mariners were categorized in
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the profit group of the SOG variable, won 78 games, and generated $299.7 million (adjusted for
inflation to 2019 dollars) in revenue. The 2018 Mariners were in the win group, won 89 games,
and generated $326.1 million (adjusted for inflation to 2019 dollars) in revenue.
Utility
In relation to revenue, the utility achieved factor (UA) was found to be a non-significant
predictor. This indicated that payroll spending efficiency for a team did not influence the amount
of revenue generated. In an initial comparison with the work of previous scholars, the nonsignificant finding would not be expected. Dietl et al. (2011) suggested that those organizations
that spend more efficiently are generally more successful. The added success comes as utility is
gained from a team getting more value out of their money spent. Higher utility, coupled with
avoidance of over-spending, allows money saved to then be allocated toward acquiring
additional resources (Vrooman, 1997). Then, theoretically, acquiring more resources for
improving the team will make the team more successful and therefore increase ability to generate
revenue (Rascher, 1997; Zimbalist, 2003).
While the above explanation provides logical reasoning for why level of utility should
impact revenue, it does not account for unequal budgets. A team with an extremely large budget
could spend inefficiently and garner low utility, yet still generate far more revenue than a smallbudget team with high utility. This circumstance is likely the case in the current study, and the
primary cause for the non-significant relationship between the UA and REV variables. An
example of this scenario from the current data set would be the big-budget 2019 San Francisco
Giants who were categorized as low utility, won 77 games, and generated about $452 million in
revenue. Conversely, the small-budget 2019 Oakland Athletics were categorized as high utility,
won 97 games, and yet only generated $225 million in revenue.
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Attendance
The next dependent variable in the current study was attendance. In the cases of both
independent factors (SOG & UA), their relationships with the ATT variable were not significant.
This finding indicates that there was no significant difference in attendance, regardless of the
level on either factor.
Strategic Organizational Goal
Based on the current findings, it could be said that attendance, represented by the
percentage of a home stadium filled, most likely would not vary based on the strategy (WM or
PM) employed by a given team. Previous scholars have shown a link between winning and
attendance (e.g., Alexander & Kern, 2004; Annala & Winfree, 2011; Davis, 2008). Though a
WM team is expected to win more games than a PM team, the effect of winning on attendance
will likely only be realized during relatively few games, closer to the end of the season, that
might be considered to have higher stakes (Davis, 2008). With such a small percentage of games
experiencing an attendance spike, it is likely that the spike is not enough to drastically shift the
attendance for the entire season and result in a significant difference between the two opposing
strategic organizational goals.
While there is not a variation in attendance, there is conceivably a significant difference
in ticket pricing for those attending that has been identified in previous research. As a team wins
more games, the demand to attend could rise. Utilizing variable ticket pricing, the team could
then charge more for their tickets (Coates & Humphreys, 2007). Teams utilizing a PM strategy,
who may not be winning as many games, could intentionally price their tickets lower to get
customers to the game. Once at the game, the organization could then make more money off the
sale of complementary goods such as concessions and merchandise (Krautmann & Berri, 2007;
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Marburger, 1997). Future teams contemplating the choice between WM and PM should realize
that there is a high probability that the choice will have no significant influence on attendance.
Nevertheless, based on their choice of strategy, the organizations should have ticket pricing
strategies ready for implementation to best fit the possible levels of consumer demand to attend
games.
Utility
In the current study, utility achieved from payroll spending efficiency was found to not
have a significant effect on attendance within a given season. From a logical standpoint, this
result seems reasonable: Fans choosing whether to attend a game would likely not make their
decision based on how efficiently a team has spent their payroll budget. Furthermore, there is a
good chance that the casual fan would not even know this information in the first place to be able
to use it as a factor in their attendance decision.
However, the possibility exists that there may be a longitudinal impact of spending
efficiency on attendance. Teams that consistently spend in an inefficient manner can risk putting
themselves in a precarious future position with an exhausted budget, and players who are
declining in talent, but still have long-term deals (Berri, 2006; Hill et al., 2017). Organizations
facing these types of scenarios could be subjected to multiple seasons where not much winning
occurs. Prolonged periods of losing seasons can then possibly have negative impact on
attendance that could be difficult to recover from (Coates & Humphreys, 2007; Davis, 2008).
While analysis of the longitudinal nature of the utility and attendance relationship was a bit
outside the scope of this study, future teams should still be aware that prolonged periods of
payroll spending inefficiency could have an adverse impact on attendance. Shorter stints (one
year or less), on the other hand, will likely have no effect.
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Wage Dispersion
Intra-team wage dispersion, represented by a Gini coefficient, was another dependent
variable in the current research (WD). The first question surrounding this variable was whether
the contrasting strategic organizational goals had differing effects on wage dispersion. Similarly,
the second question investigated low and high levels of payroll spending efficiency and their
relationships with the dependent variable.
Strategic Organizational Goal
Strategic organizational goal, represented by the SOG variable, was found to have a
significant relationship with the Gini coefficient of a team. MLB organizations categorized in the
win group of the SOG variable had a significantly higher WD (.59) than teams categorized in the
profit group (.57). Organizations that adopt a WM strategy are likely to spend a larger amount of
money than teams adopting a PM strategy (Clopton, 2013; Késenne, 2006, 2010). According to
Krautmann (2009), that willingness to spend more money will often result in larger amounts
dedicated to team payroll. With team payroll being roughly divided among the same number of
players, the larger payroll budget provides a good chance that the range in pay among players is
substantial and more spread out. The larger range then allows for more wage dispersion and is a
likely reason WM was significantly higher.
Though the relationship between SOG and WD was considered significant, the difference
in dispersion among the profit and win groups was only .02. This disparity could possibly be
larger if there were no other factors in play. However, previous scholars showed that baseball
teams who are pursuing wins are better off with a smaller Gini coefficient, as that would
represent equality in pay, and possibly translate into cohesion, camaraderie, and teamwork on the
field (Annala & Winfree, 2011; Frick et al., 2003; Hill et al., 2017). This idea that somewhat
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equal pay is more conducive to winning could be encouraging the larger-budget, winmaximizing teams to keep individual player salaries relatively close (smaller Gini coefficient),
instead of committing a large amount to just a few players (larger Gini coefficient).
Consequently, the WM teams may have a higher average salary than PM teams, but they may
also be controlling wage dispersion by paying relatively higher salaries across the board. Future
teams considering a WM or PM strategy should be aware that higher wage dispersion may
accompany higher spending on payroll, and it may be wise to control the higher dispersion at
least somewhat by ensuring salaries are equitable relative to player worth (Hill et al., 2017).
Utility
Utility from payroll spending efficiency (UA) was found to have a non-significant
relationship with WD for the current study. Similar to the ATT variable, the non-significant
finding could partially be due to the delimitation of treating each team-year observation as
independent, and therefore not including any longitudinal intra-team analysis. Previous scholars
alluded to a link between spending efficiency and wage dispersion, as teams who spend
efficiently are less likely to commit a disproportionally large amount of money to a single player
(Berri, 2006; Hasan, 2008). Inefficient spending is something that builds over time, and the
consequences may not be fully realized until years later (Fort, 2015; Zimbalist, 2003). The longterm, multi-year nature of MLB contracts, therefore, do not allow what may be an inefficient
spending decision to be felt within the same year. In terms of the current research, the nonsignificant finding shows that teams with low utility in a given year, probably will not see an
impact on wage dispersion within that year. However, previous scholars would suggest that low
utility, especially if continued, could impact a team’s financial situation in future seasons.
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Team Experience
Strategic Organizational Goal
In the current study, team experience was defined as the cumulative major league service
time of an MLB team roster in a given year. This form of team experience (TE) was found to
have a significant relationship with SOG. Teams categorized as having a strategy of wins had a
significantly higher average service time at 159.2 years, or about 4 years per player on the 40man roster. The profit group’s average cumulative TE was 153.2 years, or 3.8 years per player.
The difference between the two groups indicated that an organization with a WM strategy would
likely assemble a team with more MLB service year experience than a team with a PM strategy.
Previous scholars support the notion that WM teams would likely have more cumulative
experience than PM teams, as Berri (2006) suggested that players who have been around longer
can generally command higher salaries because they are more of a proven commodity. Similarly,
rookies and other younger players may be more of a bargain because their talent is unproven, and
thus, there is more uncertainty surrounding their expected performance (Berri, 2006; Hill et al.,
2017). Teams with a primary goal of winning games are more likely to pay more for players with
proven track records (Késenne, 2006, 2010), and therefore, they may be more likely to sign
players with more experience. Profit-maximizers are looking to save money to help their bottom
line (Zimbalist, 2003). This goal often leads franchises to let more experienced players, who
become more expensive due to their past successes, leave their team via free agency. They then
often fill those vacant spots with younger, lower-priced talent (Hasan, 2008). A real-life example
of this phenomenon that occurred during the timespan of the current study was the acquisition of
right fielder Giancarlo Stanton, and his $325 million salary, by the New York Yankees from the
Miami Marlins. Stanton, who was considered one of the top players in the game at the time, went
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to the Yankees, a notorious large-budget win-seeker, leaving behind the smaller-budget Marlins,
who replaced Stanton in right field with a comparatively inexpensive and inexperienced
alternative, Brian Anderson (Oswald, 2016).
Utility
There was no significant difference between the low and high utility groups regarding the
cumulative experience of an MLB team. The non-significant relationship between payroll
spending efficiency (UA) and team experience is somewhat logical. High utility teams could
easily have either higher or lower experience levels. To achieve high utility, that team would just
need to win enough games relative to the team payroll, regardless of experience (Rascher, 1997).
Similarly, a low utility team could also have either high or low experience, as the low utility
would be determined by winning fewer games relative to payroll. In the case of the current
research, spending efficiency is not a predictor, or factor, in determining team experience. In
fact, the opposite could even be argued: Team experience contributes to payroll (Hasan, 2008;
Zimbalist, 2003), and therefore, could be an indirect contributor to utility. Assuming this is true,
then the non-significant finding for the current research model would be sensible.
Cost of Attendance
Cost of attendance (CA), represented by the FCI, was another dependent variable in the
current study. The CA variable was found to have non-significant relationships with both
independent factor variables (SOG & UA). Therefore, it could be said that the findings indicate
the cost to attend an MLB game does not vary based on strategic organizational goal, or level of
payroll utility. Previous scholars, when addressing cost of attendance, have mostly focused on
ticket pricing. Rascher et al. (2007) suggested that the use of variable ticket pricing can yield
more revenue for those teams looking to maximize profits. Furthermore, the use of dynamic
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ticket pricing can allow an organization to take a demand-based focus and fluctuate ticket prices
based on changes in market factors (Shapiro & Drayer, 2014). Both variable and dynamic pricing
strategies could be useful to teams taking a WM approach, as teams winning more games could
have a higher demand and thus be able to command a higher price for their tickets. Similarly,
organizations taking a PM approach could also use these strategies to increase their bottom line,
by exploiting high-demand factors such as rivalry games and when popular opponents come to
play their team (Rascher et al., 2007; Shapiro & Drayer, 2014).
In terms of the current study, it could be plausible that teams with differing
organizational goals could dictate demand and ticket pricing. However, the non-significant
relationship between the independent variables and CA would imply otherwise. A possible
explanation is the nature of the CA variable. First, ticket prices, which can fluctuate, only
constitute a fraction of cost of attendance. Other items that contribute to attendance cost, such as
merchandise, concessions, and parking, are largely fixed within a season (Coates & Humphreys,
2007). As variability only occurs in a portion of the cost of attendance (i.e., ticket pricing), it is
possible that the difference in that variability by either of the two factors in the current study
does not have a substantial enough effect size to detect a difference in the overall CA variable.
Second, FCI is an average cost for an entire season. By taking an average, any variation
in CA from the effects of differing strategies throughout the progression of a season, could be
indistinguishable due to smoothing (Simonoff, 1996). In other words, cost of attendance
differences may exist based on strategic organizational goal, or utility achieved. Those
differences just may not be perceivable in the current research model due to the flatter nature of a
mean versus an incremental time series graph.
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Finally, other factors, such as market size, could be larger determinants of cost of
attendance than the two independent variables of interest (SOG & UA). This is illustrated by the
significant p-value for the relationship between the covariate (MP) and the CA variable. The
partial eta-squared value of .15 indicates a large proportion of variability in cost of attendance to
be associated with market population (Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2012). Teams in larger markets
tend to have a higher cost of attendance than those teams in smaller markets, which would be
aligned with cost of living. An example from the data set of the current study is the 2019 New
York Yankees and the 2019 Kansas City Royals. The large-market Yankees had a market
population of about 9.4 million and cost of attendance was $293.96. The small-market Royals
had a market population of about 1.7 million and a cost of attendance of $175.68.
Franchise Value
The last dependent variable in the current study, FV, represented the change in franchise
value over a given season. The idea behind this variable was that the usage of percentage change
in franchise value captured the effect of varying levels of the independent factors, while also
controlling for the large variation of actual valuations amongst different teams. An example of
the large variation from the current data set is illustrated by the 2019 Los Angeles Dodgers ($3.3
billion) who were worth more than three times the 2019 Miami Marlins ($1.0 billion).
Strategic Organizational Goal
In terms of the SOG variable, there was a significant relationship found with FV.
Organizations who were categorized as WM for a particular season experienced an average gain
of 17% from the beginning of that season to the next. Those categorized as PM also generally
experienced growth, however at a lesser average rate of 13%. Consequently, it could be stated
that teams who were categorized as having a strategic organizational goal of wins most likely
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experienced a larger growth in franchise value than those categorized as pursuing profits. The
findings of the current study would seem to correspond with the work of previous scholars:
Alexander and Kern (2004) reported a strong positive relationship between winning and
franchise values in professional sports. In application to the current research, it was established
above that WM organizations tend to win more games than their PM counterparts, and thus it
would stand to reason that those WM teams would also see a larger increase in franchise value.
Future MLB organizations looking to increase franchise value could focus on winning games,
which may be aided by the implementation of a WM strategy.
Utility
Payroll utility (UA), by itself, was found to have a non-significant relationship with FV.
Teams categorized as high utility for spending less per win had no discernable difference in
franchise value than those categorized as low utility. A possible reason for the non-significance
is that spending efficiency is only a small supplemental factor to other major determinants of
franchise value (Alexander & Kern, 2004). Evidence for that conjecture comes from when the
interaction variable (SOG*UA) was found to have a significant relationship with FV. The
combination of Win-Low had the highest percentage increase of FV (21%), followed by WinHigh and Profit-High (15%), and finally Profit-Low (11%).
The combination of Profit-Low resulting in the lowest average increase in FV is likely
due to two components. First, organizations in the profit category will likely lose more games,
which would generally result in a lower franchise valuation (Alexander & Kern, 2004; Scelles et
al., 2016). Second, spending inefficiency resulting in low utility, especially in the long term,
could be a sign of poor ownership and management, which also may have a negative impact on
franchise value (Scelles et al., 2016).
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Following the same logic as above, we would assume that the combination of Win-High
would result in the highest average increase of FV. In the reality of the current study, this was
not the case. Instead, the Win-Low combination contained the teams with the largest average
increase. The logic of teams in the win category likely winning more games, and therefore,
experiencing a larger boost to franchise value remains constant (Alexander & Kern, 2004;
Scelles et al., 2016). The difference, however, is potentially a product of the elements that
constitute low utility. Utility is a byproduct of payroll budget and team wins. As the budget of a
team increases, the number of wins also need to increase to maintain a high utility. Teams with a
very large budget must then win a substantial number of games to achieve high utility, yet at a
certain point, there is likely a diminishing return on budget spent versus games won (Fort &
Quirk, 2004; Késenne, 2006). Therefore, those large budget teams may have a more difficult
time achieving high utility, and thus may fall into the low category. Budget size is then a key,
positive contributor to franchise value (Scelles et al., 2016). For the current research, this would
then indicate that larger budget teams, who consequently achieve low utility, and employ a WM
strategy are likely to see the largest increase in franchise value over a given season. An example
from the current data set is the 2012 New York Yankees who won 95 games, achieved low utility
by spending approximately $2.4 million per win, and saw their franchise value increase 24.3%
from the beginning of 2012 to the beginning of 2013.
Market Population
The research model for the current study incorporated one covariate, MP, which
represented the population of the metropolitan area where a team was located. Note that, as
explained in Chapter III, metro areas containing two MLB teams had their populations divided in
half (Mills et al., 2016). As foreshadowed by the work of previous scholars, the current study
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found MP to be a significant predictor of almost all the dependent variables, and therefore, the
inclusion as a covariate was merited.
In relation to WIN, WD, and TE, the MP variable resulted in significant positive
relationships with each, which indicated that teams in larger metro areas were more likely to win
more games, have larger intra-team payroll dispersion, and have more team experience. The
positive relationships with those three KPIs can likely be attributed to the same factor: Larger
market teams typically have bigger budgets and more resources (Alexander & Kern, 2004). The
larger budgets and more resources then allow teams a better opportunity to acquire experienced
talent, offer a wider range of salaries, and consequently, win more games (Annala & Winfree,
2011; Hill et al., 2017).
The relationships of MP with REV and ATT were also significant and positive, as larger
market teams had a higher average revenue and attendance. MLB organizations in these larger
populated areas generally have a greater revenue generation potential due to the sheer number of
people they can reach through marketing and media (Mills et al., 2016). Similarly, there are also
more potential consumers in those larger markets to continually attend games, which should
theoretically make it easier to keep the stadium filled for home games (Davis, 2008).
Finally, the last significant positive relationship containing the covariate was with CA.
Larger market teams generally had a higher cost of attendance (per the FCI) than their small
market counterparts. The FCI is positively correlated with the cost of living, and larger
metropolitan areas normally have a higher cost of living (Coates & Humphreys, 2007).
Therefore, the cost to attend an MLB baseball game is stereotypically higher in larger markets.
The only non-significant relationship for the covariate, MP, and a dependent variable was
with FV. This is not to say that metropolitan population does not play a role in overall franchise
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value. For the current study, FV represented the growth from one year to the next. Therefore, the
current finding only indicates that the size of the market did not have any influence on the
percentage growth in franchise valuation for an organization over the span of a season.
Conversely, Alexander and Kern (2004) reported market size as a significant determinant of
overall franchise value, with those teams in larger markets regularly receiving a higher valuation.
Multivariate Research Model
A portion of statistical analysis used in the current research (i.e., MANCOVA) analyzed
the effect of the independent factors, after controlling for the covariate, on the group of
dependent variable KPIs. In other words, the analysis answered the question of whether the
group of dependent variables, as one entity, differed based on the established level of SOG and
UA. In the multivariate analysis, SOG and the interaction variable (SOG*UA) were found to be
significant, while UA was non-significant.
Strategic Organizational Goal
From a multivariate perspective, the strategic goal of an organization (i.e., profit & win)
had a significant effect on the KPIs of MLB organizations that were included in the current
study. In terms of those KPIs, a team categorized as a profit-seeker would likely have distinct
characteristics compared to a team categorized as pursuing wins. The overall finding of
multivariate significance would be expected given the variation in each of the individual
dependent variable KPIs reported from the univariate ANOVAs that were outlined earlier in this
chapter.
Previous scholars investigated WM and PM from a theoretical perspective and
empirically on a macro level. As described in Chapter II, the impact of WM versus PM has been
studied in conjunction with league-level elements including ticket-pricing (Krautmann & Berri,
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2007; Marburger, 1997), social welfare (Dietl et al., 2009), competitive balance (El-Hodiri &
Quirk, 1971; Fort & Quirk, 2004), and profit versus win orientation of varying sports and
countries (Késenne, 2006; Késenne & Pauwels, 2006). The findings of the current research
supplement the existing body of literature, as they add empirical evidence concerning
ramifications on the micro level (i.e., individual teams) of differing organizational strategies.
Utility
Utility from payroll spending efficiency (UA) was non-significant in the multivariate
analysis. Based on the univariate ANOVAs, where UA did not have a significant relationship
with any of the KPIs, the multivariate non-significance was expected. However, UA, when
combined with SOG to form the interaction variable (SOG*UA), was found to be significant in a
multivariate sense. Therefore, the dependent variables, as a singular entity, varied based on each
of the four combinations of the two independent factors. In the MANCOVA results for
SOG*UA, the F-statistic for Hotelling’s trace and Roy’s largest root were virtually equivalent at
.05. The equality of the two values would insinuate that the multivariate significant effect is
primarily due to only a few of the dependent variables (Olson, 1974). Based on the univariate
ANOVAs, that assertion can be confirmed, as only WIN and FV had a significant relationship
with the interaction variable.
Generalizability
The generalizability of these findings to other sports is limited. While the theoretical
concepts of PM, WM, and UM apply in these other contexts, the rules by which other
professional sports operate differ dramatically. Salary caps and salary floors, that are present in
leagues such as the NBA and NFL, limit an organization’s ability to truly pursue their desired
strategy, especially a maximization strategy that would put the team on an extreme end of the
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spending spectrum. Due to the relatively lenient payroll rules of MLB, desired strategies can be
enacted to a higher degree, and thus relationship and effects related to those strategies are more
evident.
Among MLB, the findings can be a bit more generalized. The study did encompass a tenyear period and included all MLB teams within that timeframe. Future teams should expect
similar effects on their KPIs according to the combination of decisions that reflect their strategic
organizational plans. The caveat to this generalizability would be a significant shift in MLB
economics. An example would be the 2020 season, which was severely impacted by the COVID19 Pandemic. With limited attendance and changes in consumption, business operations of MLB
teams were radically altered, and the pre-pandemic results are no longer generalizable amongst
MLB teams. It remains to be seen if operations will recover to pre-pandemic status, which would
again validate inter-MLB generalizability.
Finally, the findings of this research are generalizable in the sense that they support the
theoretical frameworks of the PM, WM, and UM constructs. Despite the current research
focusing on the relatively micro, individual team level, the results largely corroborated the
macro, league-level findings of previous scholars. Through the addition of a new context to the
body of research, generalizability is therefore increased.
Limitations
While the current research comprised a thorough study of organizational management
and effectiveness, it was not without limitations. The first limitation was the inability to be
absolutely sure of the actual organizational goal (i.e., profit or wins) of an MLB team. Without
having access to strategic planning of ownership and senior management, an educated guess
could only be made of the actual goal in each team-year observation. In order to determine the
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strategic organizational goal, assumptions were made based upon profit margin, which is
considered a strong indicator of win-maximizing or profit-maximizing behavior (Clopton, 2013;
Késenne, 2006; Rascher, 1997).
The second limitation involved the time-constrained attribute of the team-year
observations and its impact on the findings surrounding utility. Each team-year observation only
involved the span of one season, with no real link to the prior or subsequent seasons. Within the
frame of the current study, UA (i.e., payroll utility) was found to have a largely immaterial effect
on the dependent variable KPIs. However, the impact of inefficient spending is something that
builds over time (Fort, 2015; Zimbalist, 2003). Consistent, and prolonged, inefficient spending
has the potential to cause many future issues with an MLB team’s KPIs (Coates & Humphreys,
2007; Davis, 2008). As team-year observations only covered a single season, the longitudinal
effect of UA and SOG was not able to be investigated.
Finally, in the collection and interpretation of the data, the choice was made to treat each
team-year observation within the same franchise as an independent subject. The choice was
based on examples from previous scholars and the notion that there is often substantial change
from one year to the next within a franchise (e.g., roster turnover & management changes), and
consequently each team-year should be viewed independently (Hill et al., 2017; Mondello &
Maxcy, 2009). However, another possibility was to treat the research as panel data (Annala &
Winfree, 2011), which could have allowed for within-team analysis and overall franchise
comparisons.
Future Research
This study examined the varying organizational strategies of MLB teams and their
resulting effects on KPIs. While research related to win-maximization and profit-maximization

80
strategies is far from novel, little research has directly assessed their impact on the individual
team level. This section will outline three possibilities for future research to build upon the
findings.
First, the current study demonstrated a need for a longitudinal element of analysis,
especially with spending efficiency. Within the window of a single season, little difference was
observed from various levels of utility. However, there is at least some indication from previous
research that prolonged periods (i.e., multiple seasons) of spending efficiency, or inefficiency,
could have a more dramatic impact on KPIs. Understanding of the longitudinal nature of this
relationship could be important to budget management, pursuit of free agents, and structuring on
long-term contracts.
Second, an element of player acquisition and roster construction could be added to the
research model. The ways in which teams acquire talent for their MLB roster can range from
drafting and developing their own homegrown players through their minor league system to
signing big-name players through free agency. The financial implications also vary dramatically
based on how organizations opt to build their team. These varying strategies could be linked to
win-maximizing or profit-maximizing behavior. Furthermore, roster construction has the
potential to be another independent variable, as it could feasibly be linked to many of the MLB
team KPIs.
Lastly, a shift in methodological approach to profit-maximization, win-maximization,
and/or utility-maximization research could provide some interesting findings from a new
perspective. The majority of maximization research is quantitative due to its basis in economics
and finance, as numbers and statistics seem to be a natural fit to describe phenomena in that
realm. However, taking a qualitative, and possibly case study approach, would allow for thick
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and rich description of specific situations, while also allowing for new framing of research
questions that could elicit deeper responses (Morse & McEvoy, 2014). Applying this
methodology to the current research, questions could be asked such as: How do teams decide on
their strategic organizational goal? What roles do KPIs play in the management of MLB
organizations? Such questions would result in new findings to supplement the abundance of
quantitative research that already exists.
Conclusion
The strategic organizational decisions that are made by MLB teams play elemental roles
in the determination of measurable team outcomes (i.e., KPIs). The importance of these
organizational strategies has created a distinct line of research centered on the effects of these
varying decisions. To date, the majority of sport management studies in this area have analyzed
management strategies on an overall league, as the individual strategies of each team can be
somewhat difficult to identify. The current study acted as one of the first attempts to move
analysis to the more specific, individual team-level and offered the beginnings of a methodology
to determine profit- or win-maximization tendencies relative to other organizations within a
league. By employing empirical research in the more specific context, this research sought to
provide insight into what a team can expect based on their goals and spending decisions.
MANCOVA analysis yielded results that implied a win-maximizing strategy, relative to
profit-maximizing, generally brought about more regular season wins and revenue. Furthermore,
the roster of a win-maximizing team likely had more dispersion of wages and cumulative team
experience. Finally, these teams would also be expected to experience a larger percentage
increase in franchise value over the duration of the season. Profit-maximizing teams tended to
spend a relatively less amount of their available resources. In order to stay competitive, these PM
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teams typically relied on spending efficiency to stay competitive, while also saving money to
help their bottom line.
Under similar economic conditions, the results provide expectations for future MLB
teams who may be consider varying strategies. Teams with a primary goal of wins can expect a
relative increase in many of their organizational KPIs, while also experiencing an increase in
associated expenses. Conversely, MLB organizations who pursue profits, would likely decrease
expenses, but could also experience decreases in other related KPIs. A better understanding of
the nature of organizational management can be invaluable to current and future sport managers.
Furthermore, the ever-changing economic landscape, coupled with the complex nature of sport
business operations, offers many avenues for future research in the area.
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